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INTRODUCTION

In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the

Supreme Court decided what may well become the most cited case in legal
history.2 Interestingly, neither the bench nor the bar considered the case
revolutionary at the time. 3 What Chevron has become so well known forthe appropriate standard of review that courts apply to agency
interpretations of statutes-was not even addressed in the court below. 4 At
the time the case was argued before the Supreme Court, the parties and the
Court focused attention on the political issue: the "bubble concept." 5 But
while the importance of the political issue has faded, the importance of the
procedural issue has gained currency.
In Chevron, the Court resolved the question of how much deference
courts must give to an agency's interpretation of a statute. 6 At the time it
was decided, many scholars believed that Chevron had clearly and simply
delineated the appropriate framework for agency deference: 7 first,
determine whether Congress had decided the issue, and if not, then defer to
any reasonable agency interpretation. But Chevron has proved to be less
clear, predictable, and simple than originally envisioned. Its guidance is
unclear; its application has been, at best, uncertain.

1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). According to Professor Thomas Merrill, who reviewed the
official U.S. Reports, there are no commas in the petitioner's name. Thomas W. Merrill,
The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

STORIES 399 n. I (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) [hereinafter The Story of Chevron].
2. Chevron "has been cited in over 7,000 cases, making it the most frequently cited
case in administrative law." The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 399 & n.2. Chevron
may well soon surpass Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as the most cited case
overall. Id. at 399 n.3.
3. Id. at 402 (calling the decision "routine by those who made it").
4. Id. at 413 ("[T]here is nothing in the three petitions [for certiorari or the merits
briefs] suggesting that the parties were asking the Court to reconsider basic questions of
administrative law.").
5. Id.at 402. For a further discussion of the "bubble concept," see infra note 93.
6. Chevron addressed the degree of deference to be given to an agency's interpretation
of a statute made during the rule making process; whether its holding has been extended to
other types of agency actions is less clear. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 234 (2001) (holding that Custom Service's informal interpretation of the Tariff
Schedule was not entitled to Chevron deference); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000) (holding that the Department of Labor's interpretation contained in an
opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference).
7. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 302 (1988) ("The
Chevron test established a simple approach to a traditionally complicated issue in
administrative law.").
8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 976 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference] (stating that "[i]n time, however,
lower courts, agencies, and commentators all came to regard the analysis of the deference
question set forth in Chevron as fundamentally different from that of the previous era").
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Chevron has been the focus of tremendous legal scholarship. 9 Indeed,
one might wonder if there is anything new to say about Chevron given the
vast commentary it has generated. Given that this Article concludes that
Chevron's importance is fading, one might question whether we need
another article on Chevron. But because Chevron has been a throwaway
cite, one probably made by judicial clerks, its use has been particularly rife
with inconsistency. This Article seeks to understand this inconsistency by
focusing myopically on Chevron's first step and how its reformulation has
led to Chevron's demise. At step one, a court must determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 0 But how
Should a court look broadly for
should a court determine this?

congressional intent or more narrowly for textual clarity?
This issue was exactly the one debated by the panel majority and
dissenting opinions in the convoluted" case of Mississippi Poultry Ass'n
In that case, the choice of approach-textualist or
v. Madigan.12
The majority
intentionalist-proved to be outcome determinative. 13
adopted a textualist approach: 14 an approach "in which the statutory
language directs interpretation."' 15 Because the majority found the text of
the statute to be clear, the agency's inconsistent opinion was irrelevant.
The dissent disagreed both with the majority's textualist approach and
with its conclusion. 16 The dissent applied an intentionalist approach:'" an

9. See, e.g., David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to
Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327 (2000) (arguing that some of the common
rationales behind Chevron were incorrect); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074 (1990) (describing Chevron as the most important
Supreme Court administrative law decision); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989)
(exploring the structural implications of adopting an interpretive model that gives agencies
"principal authority for determining the meaning of the statutes" they administer); Pierce,
supra note 7, at 301-02 (discussing the "Chevron two-step" analysis); Kenneth W. Starr,
JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (asserting that
Chevron's narrowing of judicial review was correct).
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
11. This case came before a number of courts: first the district court, then the Fifth
Circuit panel, which later amended its decision, and finally the court granted en banc review
on its own motion.
12. 992 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd on reh 'g, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1364 (looking to the text and dictionary definitions to
discern meaning).
15. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID C. HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 7 (2006).

16. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1379 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority that the text was clear and turning to the goal of the legislators instead).
17. See id. at 1377 (asserting that "[a] rule that precludes courts from considering
legislative history and policy when construing statutes amounts to a quasi-evidentiary
limitation").
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approach "in which legislative intent guides interpretation."1 8 The dissent
was critical of the majority's textualist approach, writing that the textualist
approach misconstrues the nature of the inquiry as originally formulated in
Chevron; "rather than determine what a statute means, [a court] must
determine 'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."" 9 These are different questions.
Chevron itself was relatively clear about which approach to take. 20 Step
one was supposed to be a search for the "intentions" of the Legislature;
legislative history, purpose, and even social context would all be relevant to
this search. 21 But concurrently with the rise of textualism and the fall of
intentionalism, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices rejected
intentionalism as the appropriate approach for Chevron's first step.22
Today, many of the Justices routinely equate step one of Chevron with a
simple search for statutory clarity; 23 the Court proceeds to step two when
the text of a statute is ambiguous. In essence, these Justices have
interpreted Chevron itself in a textual way, by focusing on the words of the
case while ignoring the approach that was actually used.
The textualist-intentionalist divide, if you will, exists in all statutory
interpretation cases, not just Chevron cases. But it has unique application
in Chevron cases because of the way this divide affects interpretative
power. Assume, by way of example, that Congress writes a statute, which
the Legislature believes is clear. It is not; ambiguity becomes apparent
only when that statute is applied to a particular set of facts. Who resolves
this ambiguity: Congress or the Judiciary? In a non-Chevron case, the
Judiciary must resolve ambiguity for there is no other branch to do so. "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." ' 24 In these traditional statutory interpretation cases, the
textualist-intentionalist divide addresses the distribution of power between
only the Judiciary and the Legislature.
But if an agency is charged with implementing a statute, a third player
has joined the power struggle: the Executive. Chevron's first step is about
this power struggle: Which branch should resolve administrative statutory
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 15, at 7.
19. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1379 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II; Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 353 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism] (noting that
"Chevron was decided during the pre-textualist era when legislative history was routinely
considered by all Justices").
22. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) ("[W]hen the statute 'is silent
or ambiguous' we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its
implementation." (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)); infra Part 11.
23. See infra Part II.
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
18.
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ambiguity, the Judiciary or the Executive? Theoretically, 25 the smaller role
the Judiciary has at step one, the more interpretative power the Executive
will have at step two. Conversely, the greater role the Judiciary has at step
one, the less interpretative power the Executive will have at step two.
Thus, in Chevron cases there is an interpretative power struggle between
the Judiciary and the Executive-regardless of whether interpretative
power flows to the Judiciary or the Executive-that does not exist in the
simple statutory interpretation case.
For now, the Supreme Court has resolved the nature of the inquiry at
step one: it is no longer a search for congressional intent; rather, it is simply
a search for statutory clarity.26 Did this change matter? The short answer
is "yes." With the Court's reformulation of Chevron into a simple search
for statutory clarity, Chevron's relevance has started to fade, at least at the
Supreme Court level.27 Beginning relatively soon after the textualist

25. "Theoretically" because without empirical studies, we cannot know which theory
cedes more power to the Executive. "Some writers fault the textualist approach for causing
Justice Scalia to cede too much authority to federal agencies under Chevron." Gregory
E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia,
28 CoNN. L. REV. 393, 394 (1996) (presenting various views on Justice Scalia's adherence to
textualism); see William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory
Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 872 & n.36 (1993) (calling Justice Scalia a "surface
textualist" who accepts the text as the law for the purpose of avoiding judicial
responsibility); Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and
Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 50 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430 n.91 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes] (suggesting that textualism under Chevron would substantially
increase the Executive's power); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The
"New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1639 (1991) (suggesting that
textualism encompasses more than just Justice Scalia's views); Shane M. Sorenson, Note,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Two Steps in the Right
Direction, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 95, 125 (1989) (explaining how Justice Scalia's interpretation of
Chevron "suggests that Congress should be presumed to have delegated lawmaking
authority to an agency whenever legislators fail to clearly spell out their intentions"); Arthur
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 188 ("Justice Scalia recognizes that
textualism with statutes reduces the power of individual Members of Congress .... ");
see also Merrill, Textualism, supra note 21, at 354 ("[T]extualism poses a threat to the
future of the deference doctrine."). Other writers "contend that, because of his adherence to
textualism, Justice Scalia too often fails to defer to administrative agencies under the
Chevron doctrine." Maggs, supra, at 394 (citing Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo:
Interpretations and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDoZo L. REV. 1663, 1670 (1991))
(proffering possible explanations for Justice Scalia's tendency to find statutes clear at step
one); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752
(1995) (averring that a hypertextualist method of statutory construction will lead to
incoherence in the administrative state); Note, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB: Plain Meaning and
the Supreme Administrative Agency, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 287, 288 (1993)
(arguing that the Court occasionally manipulates the Chevron doctrine to reverse agency and
executive policy that the Court opposes).
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. This Article surveys only those cases in the Supreme Court. It is indeed likely that
Chevron has retained its relevance in the lower courts, especially the D.C. Circuit Court.
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reformulation took root, the Court began to limit Chevron's application:
Chevron applies
where Chevron's early application knew no bounds, today
28
less often and is cited by the Court far less frequently.
The Article evaluates this change. To do so, it proceeds as follows.
First, Part I describes the battle regarding Chevron's first step using an
illustrative case: Mississippi Poultry.2 9 Next, Part II discusses Chevron
itself and the Court's original vision of Chevron. 30 Although the language
Justice Stevens used in Chevron was equivocal, his application of that
language was anything but. From there, Part III reviews the Supreme
Court's development of Chevron's first step--from Chevron's infancy
through senescence. 31 This part reviews a number of cases from each time
period, identifies the Court's description of Chevron's first step in each
case, 32 and then evaluates the Court's application of the first step in each
case. Throughout this survey, the Court's reformulation of Chevron's first
step is detailed: the Court began intentionally, but soon after Justice
Scalia's appointment to the bench, the textualist-intentionalist battle
began.3 3 Ultimately, with a change in the composition of the Court,
Chevron's first step has become textually based. Finally, this Article
concludes by suggesting that Chevron is becoming less relevant today for
three reasons: first, the case is cited far less frequently by the Court;
second, the Court has created a new step in the process, which limits
Chevron's application; and, third, the Court has limited one of the
34
rationales supporting Chevron's holding, namely, implicit delegation.
Possibly, the Court's reformulation of Chevron has hastened its demise.
I. MISSISSIPPI POULTRY: RECASTING THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY
While it might seem odd to begin an article surveying Supreme Court
cases with a Fifth Circuit case, the majority and dissenting opinions in the
convoluted case of Mississippi Poultry Ass 'n v. Madigan35 nicely illustrate
the Chevron textualist-intentionalist divide, while also showing the
difficulty the lower courts have had and will continue to have with the
Court's confusing direction.

28.

See infra Part III.E.

29.

See infra Part I.

30.
31.

See infra Part 11.
See infra Part III.E.

32. The Justices' descriptions of Chevron's first step are far less informative than their
actual application of the first step because often a justice does little more than quote
Chevron's equivocal language. See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995) (calling Chevron's two step test "a formulation now
familiar").
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See infra Conclusion.
35. 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993), affd on reh 'g, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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At issue in Mississippi Poultry were the 1985 amendments to § 466(d) of
the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). 6 Section 466(d) specifically
required that all imported poultry products "shall ... be subject to the
same... standards applied to products produced in the United States; and...
[shall be] processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as
those under which similar products are processed in the United States. 37
The Secretary of Agriculture promulgated a regulation interpreting this
statute to require that "[t]he foreign inspection system must maintain a
program to assure that the requirements referred to in this section [are] at
least equal to those applicable to the Federal system in the United States,
are being met., 38 The Mississippi Poultry Association, Inc. and the
National Broiler Council filed a lawsuit alleging that the agency's
39 The trial court agreed. 40
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious.
Finding clarity in the statutory language, the trial court refused to give the
agency interpretation any deference.4 1
The agency appealed, and a three judge panel heard the case. 42 The
majority framed the issue as "whether Congress [had] clearly expressed its
intent in the plain language of the statute. 43 The majority described
Chevron's first step in textualist terms: "[t]he first step in determining the
intent of Congress is to examine the language of the statute. For, if the
44
language is unambiguous on its face .... judicial inquiry is complete."
Further, the majority said, when the statute is "ambiguous or silent," a
reviewing court should proceed to Chevron's second step. 45 According to
the majority, at step one, courts should look at the text only; if the text is
ambiguous, then a court should move directly to the agency's
interpretation.
Applying its articulated test, the majority found that the language "the
same" was clear and refused to explore other sources of meaning, such as
legislative history.4 6 The majority reviewed the dictionary47 and the statute
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
1992)).
41.

Id. at 1360 n.1 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1988)).
Id. at 1361 n.6 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)).
52 Fed. Reg. 15,963 (May 1, 1987) (emphasis added).
Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1362.
Id. (citing Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 790 F. Supp. 1283, 1288-89 (S.D. Miss.
Id. at 1362 (citing Miss. Poultry, 790 F. Supp. at 1288-89).

42. Later, the court on its own motion ordered a rehearing. Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan,
9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993).
43. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1363 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. To determine whether the language was clear, the majority looked first to a
dictionary and concluded that "any fair reading of the dictionary definition of 'the same'
overwhelmingly demonstrate[d] that 'the same' [was] congruent with 'identical."' Id. at
1364. While the majority acknowledged that secondary dictionary definitions included
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as a whole. Because Congress had used both "the same" and "at least equal
to" in other parts of the PPIA,4 8 the majority reasoned that when Congress
wanted to use an equivalency standard, it knew how to do so.49 Thus, the
majority focused its attention almost exclusively on the text and structure
of the statute at issue.50
In response, the dissent chastised the majority for recasting Chevron's
first step as a search for statutory clarity. 51 By transforming the step from a
search for intent to a search for textual clarity, the majority ignored the
Act's legislative history and policy implications-factors that the dissent
ultimately found dispositive.52 Believing that the majority misunderstood
Chevron's first step, the dissent set out to clarify the two-step framework.
According to the dissent, Chevron's first step required the court to find
and effectuate Congress's choice regarding the language at issue. In other
words, the search at step one was not simply for textual clarity, although an
analysis of the language of the statute would be part of the search; rather, it
was a search for congressional intent.53 Because text is evidence of intent,
the dissent, like the majority, started with the text. In contrast to the
majority, however, the dissent found the words "the same" to be
ambiguous: "the same" could mean "identical" or "equivalent., 54 Either
meaning was a fair reading of the language. 55
synonyms of "equivalent," such as "closely similar" and "comparable," the majority
reasoned that substituting "at least equal to" for "the same as" made no sense in this case
because Congress used "at least equal to" to mean equivalent in other sections of the PPIA.
For example, Congress required states and territories to have poultry processes "at least
equal to" the federal system. Id. at 1364 n.28 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1988)).
48. For example, Congress provided that "the terms 'pesticide chemical,' 'food
additive,' 'color additive,' and 'raw agricultural commodity' shall have the same meaning
for purposes of this Act as under [another act]." Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1363 n.26.
49. Id. at 1364.
50. Not content to rest on the language of the statute alone, the majority relied on
subsequent legislation passed, and turned to language from the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (1990 Farm Bill), a statute enacted after the agency
promulgated its regulation. Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2507, 104 Stat. 4068 (1990). In the
Farm Bill, Congress stated that "the regulation . . . with respect to poultry products offered
for importation into the United States does not reflect the intention of the Congress; ......
Id. § 2507(b)(1). The Bill then urged the Secretary to amend the regulation to reflect the true
legislative intent. Id. § 2507(b)(2). The Secretary ignored Congress' entreaty, however, and
allowed the regulation to remain unchanged. Miss. Poultry,992 F.2d at 1362.
51. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1375 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
52. See id. (substantiating why legislative history and policy are dispositive).
53. See id. (arguing that "Congress did not choose between identicality and
equivalence," so the analysis must go beyond statutory text).
54. See id. at 1369-75 (listing various possible definitions to illustrate the ambiguous
nature of the statute's words).
55. See id. at 1369 (stating that the "majority must concede that 'same' can mean either
'identical' or 'equivalent"'). The majority had found that "equivalent" did not make sense
because of the statute's structure-Congress used "the same" and "equivalent to" in other
sections of the statute to mean different things. See id. at 1364. The dissent dismissed the
majority's structural argument, in part, by saying "Congress understandably use[d] a
common word for several different purposes." Id. at 1372.
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Finding the text ambiguous, the dissent turned to the legislative history
and policy implications.5 6 The legislative history was telling. Prior to
1985, the statute had required that poultry standards in other countries be
"substantially equivalent" to the U.S. import standards; 57 by regulation, the
agency had interpreted this language to require standards "at least equal to"
those in the United States.58 Hence, foreign countries could export poultry
products to the United States so long as that exporting country's standards
were the "substantial equivalent of' 59 federal standards.
In 1985, the Senate Agriculture Committee 60 drafted amending language
for the PPIA. The Committee specifically adopted the agency's "at least
equal to" language, approved the bill, and sent it to the Senate for a vote.6 1
But during floor debate, Senator Helms, the chair of the Agriculture
Committee, offered a "purely technical" amendment substituting the words
"the same as" for the words "at least equal to," in order to "clarifly] the
provision to reflect the original intent of the provision as adopted by
committee in markup. ' 62 The Senate adopted the new language without
debate, discussion, comment, or recorded vote.6 3 Later, the Conference
Committee adopted the Senate version of the bill-the House bill contained
65
language64-without
any recorded consideration of
the
least
equal to" change.
this "at
rather
substantive

The dissent disdainfully rejected the majority's reliance on subsequent legislative history: "I
am aware of no case where any court has held that subsequent legislative history is at all
relevant to cases like this one, where, rather than determine what a statute means, we must
determine 'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' Id. at
1379 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984)). Moreover, the dissent argued that Congress could not satisfy Chevron's first step
after the statute in question was enacted. In other words, Chevron focuses on what
Congress meant when it enacted the language in dispute, not what a subsequent Congress
may later believe the first Congress meant. See id. at 1379 n.18 (finding no case in which a
court has "permitted Congress to satisfy Chevron's threshold inquiry after the disputed
statute had been enacted").
56. See id. at 1377 (emphasizing that "[l]egislative history and policy together
affirmatively establish that Congress has not 'directly spoken to the precise question"')
(internal citations omitted).
57. See id. at 1378 (stating that "the Agricultural Committee sent the 1985 Farm Bill to
the full Senate with the equivalence standardintact").
58. Id. (citing 9 C.F.R. § 381.196(a)(2)(iv) (1984)).
59. 7 C.F.R. § 81.301(a) (1972).
60. The U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
61. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1378 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 99-145,
at 339-40 (1985) and noting that the Committee left the Secretary's long established
equivalence standard intact).
62. Id. at 1378 (quoting 131 CONG. REC. 33,358 (Nov. 22, 1985)).
63. Id.
64. Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 313 (5th Cir. 1994) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
65. Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1378 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (noting that Senator Helms
did not mention the trade consequences of the change).
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The dissent found the lack of congressional debate regarding Senator
Helm's floor amendment compelling.66 While Senator Helms indicated
(perhaps less than truthfully) 67 that the amendment was minor, the
amendment actually had major trade implications. If the language "the
same as" meant "identical," then the amendment imposed a complete trade
barrier; no foreign country's poultry could enter the United States because
its inspection system could never be "identical" to the U.S. system.68 The
dissent found it inconceivable that Congress would enact a statute with
such major trade implications without talking about "why a barrier was
justified, what it was supposed to accomplish, or how its effectiveness
would be monitored. ' 69 Absent evidence that Congress intended "the
same" to mean "identical," the dissent concluded that Congress had never
"'directly spoke[n] to the precise question' of whether [the statute]
mandates identicality., 70 Thus, the dissent concluded that the decision of
what "the same" meant belonged to the agency. And, under Chevron's
second step, the dissent found the agency's interpretation reasonable.71
While the litigation was pending, Congress again amended the PPIA. As
part of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
(NAFTA), Congress provided that poultry imports from Canada and

66. See id. (describing how Senator Helms offered the amendment, stating that it was of
minimal importance, and that it merely accomplished the committee's original intent).
67. As a senator from North Carolina, a large poultry producing state, it is possible that
Senator Helms knew exactly what he was doing.
68. Miss. Poultry, 922 F.2d at 1378 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (commenting on how "the
facts of [the] case provide no basis on which to hold that Congress 'directly spoke[] to the
precise question' of whether section 466(d) mandates identicality").
69. Id.
70. See id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984)) (stressing the absence of congressional debate over the issue).
71. A few months later, the majority amended its decision, in part, to respond to the
dissent's criticism of its approach:
We also reiterate that the instant case does not invite a search for legislative intent.
We would be putting the proverbial cart before the horse if we were first to
consider legislative intent in testing for ambiguity. For only after the language of a
statute is found to be ambiguous are we entitled to launch an extra-statutory search
for Congressional intent. The threshold inquiry in a Chevron analysis is, of course,
whether Congress's intent is clear .... Here, the plain wording of the PPIA makes
the intent of Congress clear as a matter of law. If the language used is clear on its
face, "then the first canon is also the last: 'Judicial inquiry is complete."'
Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 9 F.3d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir.) (relying on Conn. Nat'l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)), modifying 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993). While this
quote suggests that the majority recognized the utility of a broader search for congressional
meaning, the majority later said within that same opinion that even if it were to find the
PPIA ambiguous, the agency's interpretation would still be unacceptable under Chevron's
second step because the structure of the statute made clear that "the same" meant
"identical." Miss. Poultry, 9 F.3d at 1114. In other words, the majority continued to cling
to its textualist approach despite rhetoric to the contrary.
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Mexico "shall comply with [standards that are 'the same' as those in the
United States] or be subject to... standards that are equivalent to United
States standards. 72 Perhaps because of this schizophrenic legislative
enactment, the Fifth Circuit ordered, on its own motion, that Mississippi
Poultrybe reheard en banc.73
The outcome did not change after rehearing before the full bench; the
court was tightly divided: eight to affirm, seven to reverse. The majority
remained true to its textualist approach,7 4 while the dissent accused the
majority of "exacting literalism" and of issuing "a flood of legalisms" to
avoid the "textual command., 75 According to the dissent, "[t]his case
[was] simple., 76 The statute was ambiguous, and the legislative history and
policy implications showed that Congress did not choose between
"identicality" and "equivalency;" therefore, the choice belonged to the
agency. 77 The dissent accepted as reasonable the agency's interpretation of

72. North America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§ 361(e), 107 Stat. 2123-24 (1993) (emphasis added) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1988)).
73. See Miss. Poultry, 9 F.3d at 1116 (ordering a rehearing en banc on its own motion);
Supplemental Brief of Appellants on Reh'g en Banc at 10, Miss. Poultry Ass'n Inc.
v. Madigan, No. 92-7420 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1993) (recounting the procedural history of the
case). Defendants-Appellants' request for rehearing was then denied as moot. Miss.
Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, No. 92-7420, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33337 (Dec. 16, 1993).
74. The en banc majority retained the panel majority's interpretative focus-a court
defers to an agency's interpretation only when the language of the statute is ambiguous or
silent:
[I]f Congress has clearly expressed its intent in the plain language of the statute,
"that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." If, but only if, the language
of the statute is determined to be either ambiguous or silent on the particular issue
is the reviewing court to proceed to the second Chevron inquiry: "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9). In general, the en banc opinion tracked much
of the reasoning of the panel decision. See Miss. Poultry, 31 F.3d at 300. But unlike the
panel majority, the en banc majority acknowledged that the agency offered an alternative
dictionary definition that, at least arguably, "ma[d]e some sense under the statute at issue."
Id. Acknowledging that the agency proposed the better standard, the majority nonetheless
rejected it. Id. at 310 ("[Ilt simply is not the role of the court to decide which of the two
other branches has proposed the preferable rule .... It is Congress that has the right to
make this choice, even if it may ultimately prove to be ill-advised.").
75. Id. at 310 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. The dissent pointed out that "[tihe question... is not... whether we would
select the definition of 'same' that the Secretary did. Rather our directive is to determine
whether Congress chose among the above definitions." Id. at 312. Because the Senate had
offered no debate, discussion, or even a comment to Senator Helm's floor amendment and
because the conference committee similarly failed to explain why it chose "the same" from
the Senate bill, rather than "at least equal to" from the House version, the dissent reasoned
that Congress never intended to "embed a protectionist measure in [the] bill ....
" Id. at
313-14.
77. Id.at315.
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"the same" to mean "equivalent." 78 Rather than imposing a trade barrier,
the statute merely set a floor for foreign poultry importation: imported
79
poultry had to be at least as safe and wholesome as American poultry.
Ultimately, which holding was right, the majority's or dissent's, is
unimportant to the point of this article. 80 But while the correctness of the
holding is unimportant, whether the dissent or the majority's reasoning was
correct is central. The depth of the inquiry at Chevron's first step is not
merely of academic interest. The answer directly affects the power
distribution between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government. If a court turns to sources of meaning other than the agency's
interpretation whenever the statute's text is ambiguous, theoretically, 81 the
Judiciary will retain greater interpretative power and the Legislature will
retain greater lawmaking control.
The Executive would have
correspondingly less power. If Congress fails to draft a perfectly clear
statute, a court will have many sources for discerning exactly what
Congress intended to accomplish, including the purpose of the statute,
legislative history, and social or legal context. Only when all sources fail
to resolve the ambiguity will the Judiciary be bound by the Executive's
78. Id. at311-15.
79. See id. at 310 (noting that the majority's interpretation would prohibit virtually all
poultry importation).
80. I find the question interesting and disagree with them both. I disagree with the
majority that the language "the same" is so clear that Congress could not have intended
"equivalent." But contrary to the dissent's argument, I find the legislative history to be
relatively clear that the Legislature did speak to the precise issue in question and choose
"the same" over "at least equal to." The legislative history shows that the Senate amended
this language during floor debate with Senator Helm's offer of a "purely technical"
amendment, with no discussion of change whatsoever, including the political ramifications
the new language would have. Did Congress mean to enact a trade barrier? No. The
dissent was likely correct that Congress would not have erected a trade barrier without
discussion. But if true, why then did Congress choose language that could be interpreted to
effect a trade barrier? Simply put, Congress screwed up. What the absence of any debate,
comment, vote, or discussion showed was that Congress, as a whole, failed to understand
that its statute could be interpreted to enact a virtual ban on imported poultry. Thus, rather
than show that Congress did not decide which standard it wanted-Congress specifically did
choose-the legislative history shows instead that Congress failed to consider the
implications of its choice.
After Mississippi Poultry was decided, Congress immediately invalidated the
majority's decision by amending the PPIA to replace "the same" with "equivalent to." Pub.
L. 103-465, § 431(k)(1), 108 Stat. 4969-70 (1994) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1)
(1994)). Does Congress's action mean that the dissent was correct in reasoning that
Congress never intended to enact a trade barrier and, thus, never intended "the same" to
mean "identical"? Yes and no. The amendment does show that Congress likely never
intended to enact a trade barrier, but it does not prove that Congress meant "the same" to
mean "at least equal to." Rather, it shows that Congress simply did not consider that the
change in language would have such a profound impact on trade; Congress failed to do its
job well.
81. As some have posited, the Justices do not always do what theory suggests they
should. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An EmpiricalInvestigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 826 (2006) (finding
a strong relationship between a justice's political views and his or her Chevron rulings).
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reasonable interpretation. Thus, under this formulation of Chevron, the
power to make laws remains with the Legislature, while the power to say
what those laws mean remains with the Judiciary.
But if Chevron's first step is a search for textual clarity, power should
shift to the Executive because it will be difficult for Congress to draft
unambiguous statutes. If a court turns to the agency's interpretation
whenever the statute's text is ambiguous, the Executive gains both
lawmaking and interpretative power. Note that Congress can retain control
only by drafting flawlessly-an impossible task as public choice theory has
shown.82 Language is inherently ambiguous. It is difficult for Congress to
draft well, let alone perfectly. When Congress fails to draft a perfectly
clear statute, a court will have one source for resolving this ambiguity-the
agency's interpretation. Only if that interpretation is unreasonable can the
Judiciary ignore the agency's interpretation. Under a textualist formulation
of Chevron, the power to say what laws mean should belong to the
Executive. But as some posit, even if textualists fail in practice to defer to
the Executive, interpretative power is still affected, albeit differently.
Rather than defer to the Executive when Congress intended, textualists may
well refuse to defer at all. Either way, there is an interpretative power
struggle between the Judiciary and the Executive.
So, which was right, the dissenting or the majority approach? To answer
this question, we must look not only at Chevron itself, but at Supreme
Court cases immediately following Chevron. How was Chevron originally
fashioned, and how is Chevron ultimately understood and applied today?
II.

CHEVRON: THE BIRTH OF THE TwO-STEP FRAMEWORK

More than 200 years ago, the Supreme Court first resolved the issue of
which branch-the Judiciary or the Legislature-had the power to interpret
the law in Marbury v. Madison.83 "It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." ' 84 The Legislature enacts
laws while the Judiciary interprets them. Then, along came agencies, and
their interpretative role was unclear.
Before 1984, the Supreme Court had not clearly delineated the
appropriate level of deference that a court should give an agency when the
agency interpreted a statute by regulation.85 Courts would give deference
82.

See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 25, at 446-50 (discussing public

choice theory in which statutes "reflect unprincipled 'deals' and not intelligible collective
purposes').

83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
84. Id. at 177.
85. Shortly before Chevron was decided, the Court heard Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In that case, the
Reagan Administration, which had swept into office with a promise to deregulate, argued
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to agency interpretations depending upon "the thoroughness evident in [the
agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control. 86 This level of deference is
known as Skidmore deference. Additionally, courts looked to see if the
agency, opinion had "'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in
law., 8 7 Thus, while some deference was accorded, the amount of deference
varied depending on the circumstances surrounding the interpretation. 88 In
effect, agencies faced a balancing test: the more consistent, thorough, and
considered they were, the more likely the court would defer to their
interpretation.8 9 Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and National Labor
Relations Board v. HearstPublications,Inc., agencies were little more than
expert witnesses; when agency interpretations were persuasive, the court
generally deferred to them. 90 When the interpretations did not have that
power, the court was more free to ignore them. Deference was based on
pragmatism.
Chevron changed the basis for deference. In Chevron, the Supreme
Court created the two-step framework for determining when deference
should be given to an agency's interpretation of a statute. In creating this
framework, the Court shifted the basis for deference from pragmatism to
implied congressional delegation and democratic theory. 91 Deference,
that agency decisions to do so should be given greater deference than agency decisions to
regulate; this argument was soundly rejected. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at
412-13 (averring that the Court's decision created a "significant setback to the
Administration's deregulation campaign").
86. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
87. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. I1, 131 (1944) (citing to Rochester Tel.
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939)). Skidmore applied to agency opinions
that were less formally adopted, such as opinion letters, while Hearst applied to formal
adjudication. The question of how much deference to give interpretations arrived at after
notice-and-comment rulemaking had not yet been resolved.
88. See generally Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 8, at 972-75; Colin S. Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 562 (1985)
("The decision whether to grant deference depends on various attributes of the agency's
legal authority and functions and of the administrative interpretation at issue.").
89. See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 8, at 972-75 (categorizing pre-Chevron
deference factors into three groups: factors addressing "Congress'[s] interpretive intent,"
factors addressing the "attributes of the particular agency decision at issue," and "factors
thought to demonstrate congruence between the outcome reached by the agency and
congressional intent regarding that specific issue").
90. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (describing agency administrators' ruling,
interpretations, and opinions as constituting a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance); Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131-32
(accepting the Board's decision as long as it has "warrant in the record and a reasonable
basis in law") (internal citations omitted).
91. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401. Consider, however, that the basis for
deference-a judicial presumption of implied Congressional delegation-is troubling. If the
delegation is considered final, precluding the court from any interpretative review, it likely
violates § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution, and Marbury
v. Madison's edict that "final interpretive authority rests with the courts." Hasen, supra note 9,
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which agencies had earned through their own actions, became an all-ornothing grant of power from Congress.92 Either Congress was clear and the
Judiciary did not defer at all to the agency, or Congress was unclear and the
Judiciary deferred completely to the agency. Agencies were no longer
expert advisors to the Judiciary; rather, they became competitors for
interpretative power. Thus, Chevron altered judicial deference to agency
interpretations to an all-or-nothing choice: either the court adopted or
rejected the agency's reasonable interpretation in full.
Interestingly, when it was decided, no one thought Chevron was about
deference. Instead, everyone believed that Chevron was about the "bubble
concept": specifically, "whether [the] EPA[] [could] allow States to treat all
of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single 'bubble."' ' 93 As for the deference
issue, the parties did not argue the issue; 94 the lower court did not address
the issue; 95 and Justice Stevens, who authored Chevron, later claimed that
96
the case was merely a "restatement of existing law, nothing more or less."
He cited Hearst for support of the two-step process.97 The Hearst court

at 339-40. Hasen persuasively argues that Chevron can better be understood as a prudential

"Doctrine of Independent Judicial Deference to Agencies." Id. at 357. Under this theory,
courts would defer to agencies because of their expertise in the area. Id. at 357-62 ("[A]
court's deference is purely substantive and has nothing to do with a judgment about who has
the authority to decide.").
92. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401 (explaining that if a court decided
the issue at step one, the agency would get no deference, but if the court decided the issue at
step two, the agency would get maximum deference).
93. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
The agency's "bubble concept" had been challenged twice in the D.C. Circuit Court already.
In one case, the "bubble concept" was allowed-ASARCO Inc. v. EPA; in the other, it was
not-Alabama Power v. Costle. See Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 410-11 (1979)
(concluding that the EPA's treatment of utility boilers was not an abuse of discretion);
ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 325 (1978) (accepting the definition of "source" as an
individual facility, as distinguished from a combination of facilities). The D.C. Circuit in
both cases focused on the purpose of the act at issue; because the two different acts being
challenged had different purposes, one to maintain current air quality and the other to
enhance it, the court reached different results. See ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329 n.40; Ala.
Power Co., 636 F.2d at 411. See generally The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 408
(explaining that policy, rather than text, was the focus).
94. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 413 (noting that there is nothing in the
three petitions suggesting that the parties asked the Court to address this issue).
95. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 725-28 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Then-Judge Ginsburg did not mention deference nor identify any standard of review.
One wonders whether Chevron's two-step framework would exist had Ginsburg applied
Skidmore deference or, for that matter, any deference.
96. The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 420.
97. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 n.14.
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similarly had looked first to whether Congress had intended the language at
issue to have a particular meaning, and then deferred to the agency's
reasonable choice when congressional intent was absent. 98
The facts of Chevron are straightforward; Chevron involved a challenge
to the Clean Air Act, which Congress amended in 1977. 99 The
amendments expressly required states that had not met national air quality
standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified
"stationarysources" of air pollution. 00 The statute did not specifically
define "stationary sources;"'' ° so, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) filled the gap. 10 2 By promulgating a regulation through notice-andcomment rulemaking, the EPA defined "stationary sources" to include all
03
pollution-emitting devices within an entire plant: the "bubble concept."'
A plant could increase emissions on one device so long as it
emissions on another so that plant emissions
commensurately decreased
04
remained constant.1

The regulation was challenged as being an unreasonable "construction of
the statutory term 'stationary source.""0 5 The D.C. Circuit agreed.106 The
98. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) ("It is not necessary in this
case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term 'employee.' That task has
been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act.").
99. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (2000)).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2000).
101. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
102. By this time, ASARCO and Alabama Power had been decided. See The Story of
Chevron, supra note 1, at 409 ("Final rules were not issued until August 1980, after the D.C.
Circuit's full opinion in Alabama Power had issued.").
103. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,697 (Aug. 7, 1980). The EPA defined "stationary
source" as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Id. at 52,731. Originally, the EPA dually
defined "installation" as "an identifiable piece of process equipment." Id. at 52,742. Then,
pursuant to the EPA's initial regulation, "stationary source" included both entire plants and
single devices. Id. at 52,696-97.
In 1981, President Reagan came into office on a platform of deregulation. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58. In October, the EPA repealed the dual definition and instead
adopted a plant-wide definition; using one definition consistently throughout the various
programs would reduce regulatory complexity and provide greater flexibility to the states in
designing nonattainment programs. See Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 724 (citing 46 Fed. Reg.
50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981)) (discussing the concerns the EPA asserted in connection with this
definition).
104. See Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 724 n.26 (noting that this ability under the regulation to
offset emissions allows operators to avoid the permitting process).
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
106. See Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 720 (stating that the EPA's use of the "bubble concept" to
reduce the size of mandatory new source review in nonattainment areas was improper).
Justice Ginsberg wrote the appellate court opinion prior to being appointed to the Supreme
Court by President Clinton. In coming to that conclusion, the court reviewed the statutory
language and legislative history and found both inconclusive. See id.at 723 (calling the
statute dense and stating that the question was not explicitly answered by the statute or
squarely addressed in the legislative history). Stating that it did "not write on a clean slate,"
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Supreme Court reversed, 0 7 explaining that the lower court had applied the
wrong standard, 0 8 and held that the agency's interpretation was
"permissible." 10 9 In so holding, the Court developed the now boiler-plate,

two-step framework used to evaluate agency interpretations. " 0° According
to the Chevron Court, the first question a court must resolve when
confronted with an agency's interpretation of a statute was "whether
If
Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the precise question at issue.""'
the
whether
determine
need
only
a
court
to
the
issue,
Congress had spoken
agency's interpretation was consistent." 2 Only when the court determined
that Congress did not decide the issue should a court move to the second
whether the agency interpretation was permissible or
step--determining
3
reasonable. 1
In developing its two-step framework, the Court articulated three reasons
to justify its decision to defer to the agency: implicit delegation," 4 agency
Two of these, implicit
expertise, 1 5 and political accountability."16
delegation and political accountability, departed somewhat from prior law

and have had a tremendous impact on administrative law in their own
right. 1' 7 To support its holding, the Court started with the implicit
delegation rationale and reasoned that with the power to administer a
congressionally-created program comes the power to formulate policy and
the court then reviewed its earlier opinions, ASARCO and Alabama Power. Id. at 720.
Reconciling these two somewhat inconsistent opinions, the court concluded that the "bubble
concept" was permissible when Congress intended to preserve existing air quality but
impermissible when Congress intended to improve air quality. See id. (noting that Congress
intended the new source review requirements not only to maintain air quality but to promote
cleanup of nonattainment areas). Because the purpose of the program at issue in Chevron
was to reduce emissions, an interpretation that allowed emissions to remain constant would
be inconsistent. Id.
107. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
108. Id. at 845
Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did
not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the
permit program, the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is
"inappropriate" in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality,
but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one.
Id.
109. Id. at 866.
110. See id. at 842-43.
111. Id. at 842.
112. See id. at 842-43 (noting that "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").
113. Id. at 843. The Court used both the term "permissible" and the term "reasonable."
Since Chevron was decided, the word "reasonable" has become the more common
articulation of the standard. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
115. Id.at865.
116. Id.
117. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401.
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make "rules to fill any gap left, whether implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress."' 18 When Congress explicitly leaves a gap for an agency to fill,
the agency's interpretation controls, so long as it is not arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.11 9 And when delegation is
implicit, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency. 1 20 The implicit delegation rationale expanded "the sphere" of
legitimate agency lawmaking.1 21
Before Chevron, agencies could
legitimately make "law" only when Congress explicitly delegated.1 22 After
Chevron, agencies could legitimately make "law" regardless of whether
Congress explicitly delegated. Thus, Chevron effectively expanded the
arena of legitimate agency lawmaking.
The implicit delegation rationale had another effect; it diminished the
judicial interpretative role. Prior to Chevron, courts looked to agency
opinions as merely one source for determining meaning: the better
reasoned the agency's interpretation, the more likely the court would defer
to it. But the court, not the agency, interpreted the statute. Chevron
changed that balance and weakened the Judiciary's role. The case required
courts to defer first to Congress, then to agency interpretations, regardless
of how well reasoned the interpretations were. Thus, before Chevron, the
Judiciary determined what a statute meant with an agency's expert
guidance. After Chevron, that balance shifted.
The second reason the Court provided for justifying its decision to defer
to the agency's interpretation was not new. 123 The Court in Chevron
reasoned that "[j]udges are not experts," at least not in these technical
areas.124 In contrast, agency personnel are highly qualified to make
technical
determinations and are charged with making these
determinations.1 25 Regardless of whether Congress actually intended
to
1 26
delegate to the agency, it simply makes sense to defer to such expertise.

118. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
119. Id. at 843-44.
120. Id. at 844.
121. The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401.
122. Id.
123. Both Skidmore and Hearst discussed this rationale. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1944) (opining that the agency administrator had "accumulated a
considerable experience in the problems" that the agency faced); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns.,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (commenting that administrators had the benefit of

"[e]veryday experience in the administration of the statute" which "gives it familiarity with
the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships").
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The third reason the Court provided was political accountability: the
Executive, unlike the Judicial branch, is accountable to the public. 27 Thus,
it is more appropriate for this political branch of the government to resolve
conflicting policies "in light of everyday realities." 128 "[F]ederal judgeswho have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do."' 129 This rationale was important for a
number of reasons. Prior to Chevron, not every agency opinion was
entitled to deference. 30 But Chevron established an all-or-nothing default
rule:' 3' either Congress had decided the issue or left it to the agency. In
doing so, Chevron flipped the pre-existing default rule: prior to Chevron,
deference to the agency's interpretation required a good reason, while
post-Chevron, deference to the agency's interpretation required one reason:
lack of clarity. 132 The Court reasoned that agency interpretation was
preferable to judicial interpretation because agencies were politically
accountable; the Judiciary was not. 133
Thus, contrary to Justice Stevens' belief that Chevron merely confirmed
existing law, Chevron vastly expanded the scope of agency lawmaking and
interpretive power. In doing so, Chevron changed the political landscape
by redistributing interpretative power from the Judiciary to the Executive.
1II. CHEVRON AS APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT

A. Chevron's Infancy: Intentionalism Reigns
While Chevron was a unanimous opinion, 1 34 its guidance has proven less
than perfectly clear. Debate soon arose regarding the nature of the inquiry
at the first step. Should the search be broad and include legislative history
and other sources of statutory meaning? Or should the search be narrow
and encompass the text only? The Chevron Court's description of the first
step in the framework was somewhat equivocal: on the one hand, the Court
asked "whether Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the precise question at

127.

Id.

128. Id. at 865-66.
129. Id. at 866.
130. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833,
833-34 (2001) (stating that prior to Chevron, courts only had to defer when Congress had
expressly delegated authority to an agency).
131. The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401.
132. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 8, at 978 (describing the Court's shift in
emphasis).
133. Id. at 978-79; see also The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 401-02.
134. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (noting that Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
took no part in the decision).
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issue,"1 35 on the other, it asked whether "the intent of Congress [was]
clear." 36 These questions appear to conflict: did the Court intend step one
to be a search for Congressional intent or merely a search for textual
clarity? What should a court do with this equivocal direction: turn to an
agency's opinion whenever a statute's text was ambiguous or turn to the
agency's opinion only when the text was ambiguous and other sources of
meaning, such as legislative history and social context, failed to resolve the
ambiguity?
While its language may have been equivocal, the Court's application of
its test was anything but. Perhaps because the Court approached nonregulatory statutory interpretation questions broadly at that time, 137 the
Court applied Chevron's two-step framework broadly. The Court analyzed
the enactment history,' 38 the legislative history, 139 and the statutory
text 14 0-none of which it found conclusive. 41 Indeed, the Court did not

135. Id. at 842 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court said that only "if the statute
[was] silent or ambiguous," should a court turn to the agency's construction. Id. at 843
& n.9.
136. Id. at 842 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court said, "The judiciary... must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.... If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."
Id. at 843 n.9 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court's reference to
"traditional tools of statutory construction" further supports that the search was to be broad,
rather than limited to a search of the language of the statute.
The full quote is as follows:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (internal footnotes omitted).
137. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 21, at 353 (noting that Chevron was decided
during the pre-textualism era); The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 417-18 (stating that
Chevron was decided at a time when Justices considered legislative history). At that time,
textualism had yet to emerge in the Court as the preferred interpretative approach. Chevron
was decided in 1984. Justice Scalia, who is often credited with new textualism's
emergence, did not ascend to the bench until 1986. Before Chevron was decided, the
Supreme Court routinely looked to legislative history and other sources to resolve statutory
meaning. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 21, at 353.
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845-48 (examining statutes passed in the 1950s and 1960s to
diminish pollution).
139. Id. at 851-53, 862-64 (examining the history of the 1977 Amendments).
140. Id. at 849-51, 859-62 (examining the language and requirements of the statute).
141. Id. at 861 ("We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the
statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress."); id. at 862 ("Based on our examination of
the legislative history, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is unilluminating ....
[and] silent on the precise issue before us.").
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immediately turn to the text at all, but rather reviewed the legislative
history before turning to the text.142 Only after perusing all sources did the
Court finally determine that Congress had no specific intent on the
bubble-concept issue. 143 At that point, the Court turned to the agency's
interpretation and found it to be a "permissible construction of the
statute."' 44 The Court's application of its framework was unequivocal: the
Court searched broadly for legislative intent rather than narrowly for
textual clarity.1 45 Thus, Chevron directed courts to apply an intentionalist
approach to matters of regulatory interpretation. Did the Supreme Court
follow its own directive?
In the early years following Chevron, the Court remained relatively true
to the intentionalist directive it had issued. Chevron was cited by the
Supreme Court only once in the term following its debut, although
arguably it applied more often. 146 In this lone instance, it was cited by the
dissent, not the majority. Writing for the majority in Securities Industry
Ass 'n v. Board of Governors of FederalReserve System, Justice Blackmun
held that because commercial paper fell within the plain language and
purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act, it was a "security" under the Act. 147 In
describing the level of deference due to the Board's interpretation of the
statute, Justice Blackmun failed to cite Chevron at all:
The Board is the agency responsible for federal regulation of the national
banking system, and its interpretation of a federal banking statute is

entitled to substantial deference.... whenever its interpretation provides
a reasonable construction of the statutory language and is consistent with
legislative intent. We also have made clear, however, that deference is
not to be a device that emasculates the significance of judicial review.
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute only sets the
framework for judicial analysis; it does not displace it. A reviewing
court must reject administrative constructions of [a] statute, whether

142.
143.
144.

Id. at 845-59.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 866.

145.

See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 8, at 976 (maintaining that "[i]f the

court concluded that Congress had a 'specific intention' with respect to the issue at hand, it
would adopt and enforce that answer" (internal footnote omitted)).
146.

See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 421 (noting that "nineteen argued cases

in the next Term... presented some kind of question about whether the Court should defer
to an agency interpretation").
147. 468 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1984) (construing Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933,
ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162).
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reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the
statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to

implement. 148
the litigation, the
Because the Board had changed its position during
149
majority refused to defer to the interpretation at all.
Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented
and reminded the majority of its recent landmark opinion: "Because of the
Board's expertise and experience in this complicated area of law, and
because of its extensive responsibility for administering the federal banking
laws, the Board's interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act must be sustained
unless it is unreasonable." '1 50 Reviewing the language of the Act and its
legislative history, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Board's
of the statutory
interpretation was "certainly 'a reasonable construction
'''
language and [was] consistent with legislative intent. 051
The following year, Justice White, writing for Justices Burger, Brennan,
Powell, and Rehnquist in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 152 applied Chevron to uphold the EPA's
decision that it could issue variances under the Clean Water Act. Under
§ 307(a) of the Act, 153 the EPA was required to publish a list of toxic
54
pollutants and set effluent limitations for direct and indirect dischargers.1
To comply, the EPA created categories of sources and set uniform
In addition, the EPA
discharge limitations for those categories.155
developed variances from the categories to ensure "that its necessarily
rough-hewn categories [did] not unfairly burden atypical plants.' 5 6 An
interested party could request a "variance to make effluent limitations
either more or less stringent."'' 57 In 1977, Congress amended the statute to
prohibit the secretary from "modify[ing] any requirement of [the Act] as it
applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list., 15 8 The
1 59
EPA continued to allow the variances and even expanded the program.
148. Id. at 142-43 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
149. Id. at 143-44 (determining that "less weight" was due to the Board because it
changed its position).

150. Id. at 161 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 173 (quoting Secs. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207, 217 (1984)).
152. 470 U.S. 116 (1985). Interestingly, Justice Alito, as assistant to the Solicitor
General, argued this case for the EPA. Brief for the United States Environmental Protection
Agency at 1, Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Nos. 83-1013, 83-1373).

153. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
154. Chem. Mfrs. Ass"n, 470 U.S. at 119.
155. Id. at 119-20.
156. Id. at 120.
157. Id. at 120-21.
158. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 124 (stating that the EPA promulgated regulations explicitly allowing
variances, but that variances were infrequently granted).
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When challenged, the EPA argued that the amendment prohibited only
those modifications expressly permitted by other provisions of the Act, not
the variances. 160

In applying Chevron, Justice White defined the first step in an
intentionalist way: "[I]f Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary
to that of the Agency, our duty is to enforce the will of Congress."' 61
Justice White also applied the test in an intentional way; he began with the
text and acknowledged that the plain language of the statute seemed to
undermine the agency's interpretation:
[Plaintiff] insists that the language of § 301(l) is itself enough to
require affirmance of the Court of Appeals, since on its face it forbids
any modifications of the effluent limitations that EPA must promulgate
for toxic pollutants. If the word "modify" in §301(1) is read in its
broadest sense, that is, to encompass
any change or alteration in the
162
standards, [Plaintiff] is correct.
Nonetheless, the majority reasoned that this interpretation of the word
"modify" made no sense when the statute was viewed in its entirety; thus,
the EPA's interpretation of the statute was not foreclosed. 63 Articulating
an intentionalist view of Chevron, the majority said, "We should defer to
[the agency's] view unless the legislative history or the purpose and
structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of
Congress."' 164 True to its word, the majority examined the language, the
legislative history, and the purpose of the statute165 to conclude that none of
166
these sources were determinative of Congress's intent on this issue.
Finding no evidence of Congress's intent, the majority deferred to the
agency's interpretation.
Viewed in its entirety, neither the language nor the legislative history of
the Act demonstrates a clear congressional intent to forbid EPA's
sensible variance mechanism for tailoring the categories it promulgates.

In the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary, we167accept
EPA's conclusion that § 301 (1)does not prohibit FDF variances.
Thus, the majority upheld the EPA's interpretation after applying Chevron
in an intentionalist way.

160. Id. at 125 (detailing the EPA's argument that the variances were a distinct issue).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 125-26 (finding that "modify" had "no plain meaning").
164. Id. at 126.
165. Id. at 129 (stating that "the legislative history itself does not evince an unambiguous
congressional intention to forbid all FDF waivers with respect to toxic materials" and that
"[n]either are we convinced that FDF variances threaten to frustrate the goals and operation
of the statutory scheme").
166. Id. at 134.
167. Id.
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Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justices Stevens and Blackmun,
agreed with the majority's intentionalist approach but disagreed with the
conclusions the majority reached. 68 Like the majority, Justice Marshall
looked for "the clear intent of Congress"' 69 to resolve the dispute. But
unlike the majority, he rejected the agency's interpretation because it was
"inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress, as evidenced by the
statutory language, history, structure, and purpose."' 7
Thus, in Chevron's infancy, all of the Justices described and applied
Chevron in an intentionalist way. While they did disagree on the outcome
of a case, they did not fight about the appropriate approach to Chevron.
But this harmony soon dissolved.
B. Chevron's Terrible Twos: Scalia Enlists
In 1986, Justice Antonin Scalia was appointed to the bench. 7 ' Many
have discussed Justice Scalia's resurrection of textualism, advanced
initially from his position on the D.C. Circuit Court.172 It was not long
before textualism's influence began to affect the rest of the Court and its
Chevron analysis. "Committed textualists" would feel compelled to
"reformulate the two-step inquiry to purge it of these intentionalist
elements."1

73

The Court's change in analysis can first be seen in Young v. Community
Nutrition Institute, where Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Burger,
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, held that the
Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) interpretation of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act was reasonable. 74 The Act provided that whenever a
toxin could not be eliminated altogether, "the Secretary shall promulgate
regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he
finds necessary for the protection of public health."' 175 Such limits were
known as "tolerance levels." The FDA had refused to promulgate

168. Id. at 135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. Justice O'Connor agreed but wrote separately because she believed that the
language of the statute and its legislative history precluded the EPA's interpretation. She
found it unnecessary to also look at the purpose of the statute. Id. at 165 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
171. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf [hereinafter Supreme Court Biographies].
172. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the
Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 206 (describing the rise of "institutional legislative
history" after Scalia's new textualism gained influence).
173. Merrill, Textualism, supra note 21, at 353.
174. 476 U.S. 974, 975-76 (1986).
175. Id. at 984 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000)).
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tolerance levels for Aflatoxin.' 76 The simple issue was whether the word
"shall" modified "promulgate" or "to such extent as he finds necessary for
' 77
the protection of public health."'
In analyzing the case, Justice O'Connor was not clear in describing her
178
Chevron approach; she simply quoted Chevron's equivocal direction.
But in applying the two-step process, she was very clear; she used a
textualist approach, reviewing the text of the statute only., 79 Finding it
ambiguous, she turned-without first discussing the appropriateness of
reviewing legislative history or other sources of meaning in light of this
ambiguity-to the reasonableness of the agency's opinion. Reviewing the
legislative history and potential for absurdity, 180 she ultimately deferred to
the agency. 181
Justice Stevens dissented and criticized the majority opinion as lacking
"judgment and... judging.' ' 182 Justice Stevens did not find the language
ambiguous; nor did he find the interpretation to be supported by the
legislative history. 183 Rather, he chastised the majority's approach as
simplistic and formulaic:
The task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing
an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference. A statute is not
"unclear unless we think there are decent arguments for each of two
competing interpretations of it." Thus, to say that the statute is
susceptible of two meanings, as does the Court, is not to say that either is
acceptable .... As Justice Frankfurter reminds us, "[t]he purpose of
construction being the ascertainment of meaning, every consideration
brought to bear for the solution of that problem must be devoted to that
end alone"......

The Court, correctly self-conscious of the limits of the

judicial role,84 employs a reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art
ofjudging.1
The battle over the appropriate approach had begun.

176. Whether this type of agency action is entitled to Chevron deference would likely be
debated today. See infra Conclusion.
177. Young, 476 U.S. at 979-80.
178. Id. at 980.
179. Id. at 980-81.
180. Id. at 981-83 (suggesting that the Court's interpretation would not "render that
provision superfluous").
181. Id. at 981 (finding "the FDA's interpretation of § 346 to be sufficiently rational to
preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the FDA").
182. Id. at 985 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 988 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 352 (Harvard Univ. Press
1986) and Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.

REV. 527, 529 (1947)).
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Justice Scalia began his own assault in 1987, when the Court decided
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.'85 In that case, a foreign citizen requested asylum
under the Refugee Act of 1980, which authorized the Attorney General' '' to86
grant asylum to refugees who had "'a well-founded fear of persecution. 1
Adopting the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretation, the
immigration judge had held that the "well-founded fear of persecution"
that there was "a clear probability of
language required the refugee to show
1 87
home.
returned
she
if
persecution"
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,' 88 rejected the BIA's
interpretation.1 89

He described

Chevron,'90 then analyzed the text,

structure, and legislative history of the Refugee Act to conclude that all
three precluded the agency's interpretation. 9 '
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. But he wrote separately to
promote his textualist agenda by criticizing the majority's approach to
Chevron:
I am... troubled, however, by the Court's discussion of...
deference. Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the [agency's]
interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning.., and the
structure of the Act,. . . there is simply no need and thus no justification
for a discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to deference.
Even more unjustifiable, however, is the Court's use of this superfluous
discussion as the occasion to express controversial, and I believe
erroneous, views on the meaning of this Court's decision in Chevron.
Chevron stated that where there is no "unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency." This Court has consistently interpreted
Chevron... as holding that courts must give effect to a reasonable
agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent
with a clearly expressed congressional intent. The Court's discussion is
flatly inconsistent with this well-established interpretation. The Court
first implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for

185. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
186.

Id. at 423 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000)).

187. Id. at 425 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined Justice Stevens'
majority opinion. Id. at 422.
189. Id. at 423.
190. Id. at 446-48 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
191. Id. at 431-44. Concurring, Blackmun agreed that the agency's "interpretation of the
statutory term [was] so strikingly contrary to plain language and legislative history." Id. at
450 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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that of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory
construction," they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper
interpretation of the statute. But this approach would make deference a
doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would
otherwise be unable to construe the enactment92 at issue. This is not an
interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.1
Justice Scalia was particularly troubled by the majority's use of
legislative history. 93 According to Justice Scalia, when a statute has a
plain meaning, courts must accept that meaning and not search for
"unenacted legislative intent."'' 94 Thus, while Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority's conclusion, he disagreed with the majority's intentionalist
approach to Chevron, and used his concurrence to attack that approach.
But no one joined his attack. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and White
dissented, not because they disagreed with the approach the majority used,
but rather because they found the language of the act and the legislative
history ambiguous. 95 Because traditional tools of construction did not
resolve the ambiguity, the dissent moved to the second step of Chevron and
would have affirmed the agency's interpretation as a reasonable
construction of ambiguous legislation.1 96 Th,!s, Justice Powell, like the
majority, remained firmly in the intentionalist camp. Justice Scalia was
alone in his textual tirade; but he would not remain so for long.
In 1988, Justice Powell left the Court and was replaced by Justice
Anthony Kennedy. 97 Justice Kennedy soon parroted Justice Scalia's
textualist approach. For example, in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,'98 the
issue before the Court was whether the Secretary of the Treasury's
regulations, which permitted the importation of certain foreignmanufactured goods under two exceptions, were reasonable agency
interpretations of the Tariff Act.199 Because two separate exceptions were
analyzed, the decision included a number of concurring and dissenting
opinions. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. In doing so,
he described Chevron's first step in textualist terms:

192. Id. at 453-54 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 452-53 (agreeing that the standards were not the same, but suggesting that the
language was clear).
194. Id. at 453.
195. Id. at 461 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that a "well-founded fear" suggested
"some objective basis without specifying a particular evidentiary threshold").
196. Id. at 455.
197. See Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 171 (detailing the biographical
information of the current Justices).
198. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
199. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
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In determining whether a challenged regulation is valid, a reviewing
court must first determine if the regulation is consistent with the
language of the statute.... If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue addressed by the regulation, the question
becomes whether the agency regulation is a permissible construction of
the statute. If the agency regulation is not in conflict with the plain
language of the statute, a reviewing court must give deference to the
agency's interpretation of the statute.
After describing Chevron in this way, Justice Kennedy applied the
two-step test consistently by reviewing only the statute. 20 ' Finding the
statute ambiguous as to one of the issues only, Justice Kennedy deferred to
the agency's interpretation on this issue. But because he viewed the other
interpretation to be inconsistent with the plain text of the statute, he found
202
the agency's interpretation to be unreasonable on this second issue.
Justice White agreed.20 3
In contrast, Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall and
Stevens, described Chevron in an intentionalist way: "An assessment of the
reasonableness of the [Agency's] interpretation ... begins, as always, with
an assessment of 'the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole."' 20 4 Justice Brennan made
clear that the analysis was not complete after a simple textual review,
however:
Even if the language of [the Act] clearly covered [the issue], "[i]t is a
'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."' It is therefore appropriate to turn to our other
tools of statutory construction" for clues of congressional
"traditional
2 5
intent. 0
After finding the text ambiguous,20 6 Justice Brennan reviewed the
legislative history and purpose of the Act to conclude that the agency's
interpretation was consistent with Congress's intent.20 7
Justice Scalia dissented, in part, from Justice Kennedy's opinion. While
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Kennedy's "analytic approach, 20 8 he
disagreed with Justice Kennedy's application of that test to one of the
200. Id. at 291-92 (internal citations omitted).
201.
202.

K Mart Corp., 486
Id. at 294.

203. Id. at 284.

U.S. at 292-94.

204. Id. at 297 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 300 (internal footnote omitted) (citing INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
446 (1987)).
206. Id. at 299 (finding the phrase "foreign manufacturer" to mean either a foreigner or a
foreign country).
207. Id. at 309.
208. Id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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20 9
agency's regulations, which he concluded conflicted with the plain text.
In response to Justice Brennan's intentionalist approach, Justice Scalia was
scathing: "Justice Brennan's approach ...requires judges to rewrite the
United States Code to accord with the unenacted purposes of Congresses
long since called home. 21 ° Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Blackmun
signed onto Justice Scalia's dissent.
At this point, the Court was split into three imperfect camps: those few
who remained relatively faithful to Chevron's intentionalist
underpinnings-Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall, those who
appeared to reject that approach in favor of a more text-based approachScalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, and White, who waffled
between the two.2 12 Justice Scalia's textualist first step made strong
headway in the few short years he had been on the bench.

C. Chevron's 'Tween Years: New Recruits Muddy the Battlefield
For the Court, the late 1980s and early 1990s were a time of debate and
confusion about Chevron. During this time, the composition of the Court
changed dramatically. Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell in 1988.
In the next six years, four new Justices joined the bench as four others died
or retired. In 1990, Justice Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Marshall; in
1993, Justice Ruth Ginsberg replaced Justice White; and in 1994, Justice
Stephen Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun. 3 The new faces brought two
immediate changes.
First, during this time, the Court was very inconsistent in its approach to
Chevron, even getting it backwards in one case. At times, this new Court
spoke and acted textually, 2 14 at other times, it spoke and acted
intentionally. 21 5 And, at least once, the Court applied Chevron's second
step first.216 It seems that the Justices were learning to work with Chevron
during this period.
209. Id.

210. Id.at 325.
211. Id. at318.
212. This second group likely signed onto opinions because of the conclusions that were
reached, not because of the approach to Chevron that was used. See generally Merrill,
Textualism, supra note 2 1, at 365 (opining that each Justice had an incentive for abandoning
legislative history analysis if he or she wanted Thomas's or Scalia's vote).
213. See Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 171 (detailing the biographical
information of the current Justices).
214. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417
(1992) (stating that "[i]f the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some
respects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency").
215. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 32 (1990) (focusing on
Congressional intent in enacting the Paperwork Reduction Act).
216. See, e.g., Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Oh. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (looking at
the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation before looking at the clarity of the
language).
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Second, with the exception of Justice Stevens, the original author of
Chevron, the intentionalist Justices (Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) were gone, replaced for the most part with more pragmatic and
less dogmatic Justices. Over time, these new judges would leave their
imprint on the Court's Chevron doctrine; but first, they had to understand
Chevron. Thus, the cases from this time frame illustrate the Justices'
uncertainty.
Sometimes, the Justices just got Chevron wrong. For example, in Public
Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 217 Justice Kennedy-writing for
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia 2 8 --applied Chevron's two-step test backwards. In
Betts, the Court evaluated the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) interpretation of the term "subterfuge" in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 2 19 The Act forbade public and private
employers from discriminating against employees on account of age.
Under an exception, 220 however, age-based employment decisions taken
pursuant to "any bona fide employee benefit plan.., which [was] not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]," were exempt.22 The EEOC
interpreted "subterfuge" to exclude plans that prescribed lower benefits for
older employees provided that the employer justified the program with a
plausible business purpose. 222th Finding the agency interpretation to be at
odds with the plain language of the statute, the majority refused to defer.
Justice Kennedy's description of Chevron was text-based: "[N]o deference
is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the
Even contemporaneous and longstanding agency
statute itself.
interpretations must fall to the extent they conflict with statutory
language. 223
In so considering, the majority misapplied Chevron. Rather than follow
Chevron's two-step framework-look to see if Congress spoke to the
precise issue first, then review the agency's decision for reasonablenessthe majority first examined the reasonableness of the agency's
The majority found that the agency's interpretation
interpretation.
contradicted' the clear statutory language and was inconsistent with the
legislative history. 224 After rejecting the agency's interpretation as invalid,

217.

492 U.S. 158 (1989).

218. Id. at 160.
219. Id. at 171 (discussing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (2000).
221.
222.
223.
224.

Betts, 492 U.S. at 164 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)).
Id. at 170.
Id. at l71.
Id. at 175.
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the majority then attempted to discern the "precise meaning of the term. 22 5
In doing so, the majority used an intentionalist approach to this pure
question of statutory interpretation. The majority reviewed the text and
found it ambiguous.226 The majority then turned to the legislative history
and a related statute-Title VII. 227 Thus, in this case, the majority
described Chevron's first step in a textualist way, but applied the two-step
test backwards.
Not surprisingly, Justice Marshall, in dissent, cried foul:
Ordinarily, we ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by looking
to its text, and, if the statutory language is unclear, to its legislative
history. Where these barometers offer ambiguous guidance as to
Congress' intent, we defer to the interpretations of the provision
articulated by the agenc[y] ....Eschewing this approach, the majority
begins its analysis not by seeking to glean meaning from the statute, but
by launching a no-holds-barred attack on the
[agency's
interpretation] .... Only after burial, and almost by afterthought, does
the majority attempt to come up with its own interpretation of the
228
[language] ....
229
Because the dissent found the text and structure of the act ambiguous,
the dissent reviewed the legislative history and found it to be quite clear.23 °
Coincidentally, the agency interpretation was consistent with congressional
intent in this instance: the statute meant exactly what the agency said it
meant. 23' Thus, the dissent would have stopped at Chevron's first step
because Congress had spoken on this precise issue. The dissent remained
true to Chevron's intentionalist directive and accused the majority of
2 32
manipulating the outcome for a desired result.

225. Id.
226. Id. at 177. The Court found that the term "subterfuge" had multiple possible
meanings. Id. at 170-71.
227. See id. at 175-82 (drawing parallels of congressional meaning between the statutes).
228. Id. at 185-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
229. See id. at 188-89 (explaining that the majority's approach is "puzzling in light of
[the majority's] concession that its construction of the words of the statute is not the only

plausible one") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
230. See id. at 189.
231. Id. at 192 (arguing the agency's interpretation was "mandated" by Congress). Had
the language and history been ambiguous, the dissent would have deferred to the agency
under Chevron. ld.
232. Betts is fascinating in that the majority opinion illustrates the Supreme Court's
reluctance to relinquish interpretative control. By reversing the two-step process, the

majority essentially eliminated the agency from the interpretative process and returned to a
Skidmore-based approach. The agency's opinion had no power to persuade; thus, to the
majority, it was irrelevant.
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Despite this early confusion, the Justices returned to intentionalism in
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America.233 Justice Brennan-writing for
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and (very
surprisingly) Scalia 234-rejected the agency's interpretation. The Court
held that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980235 did not authorize the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review and countermand
agency regulations that mandated disclosure by regulated entities to third
parties.23 6 The statute applied whenever "obtaining or soliciting facts by an
agency through.., reporting or recordkeeping requirements" took place.237
OMB had interpreted the language "obtaining or soliciting facts by an
agency" to apply whenever any agency required a regulated entity to
disclose information to third parties, not just when an agency required the
regulated entity to disclose to the government.2 38 The majority disagreed.
To reach its conclusion, the majority applied an intentionalist approach
to the issue, and determined that the language, structure, and purpose of the
Act proved that OMB's position was untenable because Congress intended
the Act to encompass agency disclosure rules only, not third party
disclosure rules.239 Justice Brennan described Chevron's first step as
follows:
"[O]ur first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using
traditional tools of statutory construction." Our "starting point is the
language of the statute," but "in expounding a statute, we are not guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, 24but
0 look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy."
Although the majority stated that the starting point in a Chevron inquiry
is always the statutory language, it made clear that the search should not
stop there. 24' Applying an intentionalist approach, the majority first
rejected OMB's plain meaning argument, finding "the provision detailing
Congress's purposes in enacting the statute" particularly useful.24 2
Additionally, the Court reviewed the legislative history and found that
233. 494 U.S. 26 (1990). The issue before the Court was whether the Office of
Management and Budget correctly determined that it had the authority under the Paperwork
Reduction Act to review agency disclosure regulations requiring regulated entities to
disclose information to third parties. Id. at 32.
234. Id. at 27-28.
235. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2000).
236. See Dole, 494 U.S. at 32 (affirming the decision of the Third Circuit).
237. Id. at 35 (alteration in original).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112,
123 (1987), and Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985), and Massachusetts
v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).
241. See Dole, 494 U.S. at 36 (suggesting that it is also important to consider the entire
act, as well as its objects and policy).
242. Id.

2007]

CHEVRON 'S DEMISE

OMB's interpretation was "contrary to clear legislative history. 243
"Because we find that the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress's
intention, we decline to defer to OMB's interpretation. ' 44 Thus, the
majority reviewed the language, structure, legislative history, and purpose
of the Act to determine Congress's intent in the statute before it and reject
OMB's interpretation. 4 5 Given his general textualist approach, it is indeed
odd that Justice Scalia signed onto this opinion, which represented
everything about statutory interpretation with which he disagreed.
The dissent, written by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, disagreed not with the majority's intentionalist approach, but
with the conclusion that flowed from that approach. In the dissent's
opinion, the Act was ambiguous, the purpose was broader than described
by the majority, and the legislative history was unconvincing; 246 therefore,
deference to the agency was due under Chevron. 247 But, while both
opinions looked broadly for congressional intent, the dissent, like Justice
Scalia in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,chided the majority for turning Chevron
into a doctrine of desperation:
The Court concedes that the Act does not expressly address "whether
Congress intended the Paperwork Reduction Act to apply to disclosure

rules as well as information-gathering rules." Curiously, the Court then
almost immediately asserts that interpreting the Act to provide coverage
for disclosure requests is untenable. The plain language of the Act,
however, suggests the contrary.
Indeed, the Court appears to
acknowledge that petitioners' interpretation of the Act, although not the
one the Court prefers, is nonetheless reasonable: "Petitioners'
interpretation.., is not the most natural reading of this language." The
Court goes on to arrive at what it believes is the most reasonable of
plausible interpretations; it cannot rationally conclude that its
interpretation is the only one that Congress could possibly have intended
.... As I see it, by independently construing the statute rather than
asking if the agency's interpretation is a permissible one and deferring to
it if that248is the case, the Court's approach is clearly contrary to
Chevron.

243.
244.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.

247.

Id. at 43-44.

245. Id. The dissent disagreed with the conclusion, not the approach: "Since the statute
itself is not clear and unambiguous, the legislative history is muddy at best, and [the
Agency] has given the statute what I believe is a permissible construction, I cannot
agree .... " Id. at 53 (White, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 43, 51-52 (White, J., dissenting) (finding the majority's conclusions
"curious").
248. Id. at 44-46 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
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Interestingly, this was not the first time that a disagreeing Justice
charged colleagues with eviscerating Chevron by rejecting the agency's
interpretation and deciding for themselves what the statute meant. 249 And it
would not be the last.
In 1992, the Court moved further toward textualism in NationalRailroad
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.250 The Court reviewed the
Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation of the Rail Passenger
Service Act,25' which was made during an informal adjudication.252
Whether Chevron appropriately applies to agency interpretations made
during informal adjudication remains unclear today.253 But, at the time this
case was decided, the majority relied on Chevron as if there were no
doubt.2 54 Justice Kennedy, writing for Justices Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, described Chevron as follows:
[W]hen a court is reviewing an agency decision based on a statutory
interpretation, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."..... If the text is

ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some respects, a degree of
deference is granted to the agency, though a 255
reviewing court need not
accept an interpretation which is unreasonable.
Applying Chevron, the majority looked only to dictionary definitions of
the word at issue: "required." Finding the language ambiguous, the Court
immediately deferred to the agency's interpretation. 6 In doing so, the
majority never looked beyond the text for resolution of the ambiguity.
Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Stevens signed onto this opinion, which
took an approach at odds with his intentionalist view.
In its opinion, the majority laid the ground work for a simple, but
ultimately unworkable test: the "alternative dictionary definition" test.
Under this test, "[t]he existence of alternative dictionary definitions of the
word [at issue], each making some sense under the statute, itself indicates
that the statute is open to interpretation. 25 7 In essence, Justice Kennedy

249.

See, e.g., INS

v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421,

concurring).

454 (1987)

(Scalia, J.,

250. 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
251. 45 U.S.C. § 562(d) (1988) (repealed 1994).

252. Boston &Me. Corp., 503 U.S. at409-10.

253. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (11 th Cir. 2000) (analyzing
whether Chevron applies to an informal adjudication); see also discussion infra Part III.E.
254. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. at 417 (calling Chevron deference a "well-settled
principle of federal law").
255. Id. at 417-18 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
256. Id. at 419 (looking at an amendment enacted during the pendency of the appeal).
257. Id. at 418.
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implied that courts should defer to an agency's interpretation when the
language at issue has more than one dictionary definition. Under this
formulation, agency deference would have increased significantly as it is
rare for language to have only one definition.5 8 In any event, the Court
soon backed away from this overly simplified articulation of Chevron's
first step.259
The dissent, written by Justice White and joined by Justices Blackmun
and Thomas, was critical not of the majority's articulation or application of
Chevron's two-step test, but rather of the majority's willingness to defer to
an interpretation made for the first time in the government's brief on appeal
before the Court. 260 The dissent believed that because the agency never
actually interpreted anything prior to the litigation,
there was no
261
interpretation to which the Court could or should defer.
In contrast, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 26 2 the
Justices disagreed on the proper approach for applying Chevron. The
majority used a textualist approach, while the dissent returned to Chevron's
intentionalist underpinnings. Although neither the majority nor dissent
described Chevron, their approach to Chevron is readily apparent from the
text of their opinions.
In MCI Telecommunications Corp., Justice Scalia, writing for Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg,263 applied
Chevron in a textualist manner. The statute at issue provided that the

258. Indeed, in MississippiPoultry, the en banc majority rejected the agency's argument
that when language has more than one definition in the dictionary, the language is inherently
ambiguous and subject to agency interpretation. Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d
293, 307 (5th Cir. 1994). The majority correctly noted that such an approach would
radically shift the balance of power from Congress to the agencies because language is
inherently indeterminate. There will always be multiple dictionary definitions. Id.
259. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (noting that in
some cases, one dictionary definition can contradict other definitions that are recognized
and widely accepted).
260. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. at 424-25 (White, J., dissenting):
The majority opinion proceeds from the well-established principle that courts
should defer to permissible agency interpretations of ambiguous legislation. I have
no quarrel with that general proposition. I do, however, object to its invocation to
justify the majority's deference, not to an agency interpretation of a statute, but to
the post hoc rationalization of Government lawyers attempting to explain a gap in
the reasoning and factfinding of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 8, at 987
(arguing that if Chevron rests on implied delegation of authority, it should not matter when
or how the agency first articulates its decision.).
261. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. at 428 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing to remand the
case so that the agency could "do its job properly").
262. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
263. Id. at 219.
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Federal Communications Commission (FCC) "may, in its discretion and
for good cause shown, modify any requirement" of the statute. 264 The FCC
interpreted the word "modify" to allow it to make a tariff filing requirement
optional.265 The issue for the Court was whether the FCC's decision to
make the filing optional for all nondominant long distance carriers was a
valid exercise of its authority. The FCC argued that its interpretation of the
266
word "modify" was entitled to deference under Chevron's second step.
The majority disagreed. Reviewing dictionary definitions and other
sections of the Communications Act of 1934, Justice Scalia concluded that
the power to "modify" a requirement did not include the power to eliminate
it altogether.267 Although Justice Scalia was sympathetic to the FCC's
argument that its interpretation better furthered the purpose of the statute,
"the Commission's estimations[] of desirable policy cannot alter the
meaning of the federal Communications Act of 1934. ,268
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justices Blackmun and Souter,
disagreed. 269 Arguing that the majority rejected an agency's interpretation
"in favor of a rigid literalism that deprive[d] the FCC of the flexibility
Congress meant it to have in order to implement the core policies of the
Act in rapidly changing conditions, 27 ° Justice Stevens focused on the
purpose of the statute and found that the FCC's interpretation was a
permissible construction of the statute.27' Indeed, he chided the majority's
over-reliance on the dictionary for determining the meaning of the statute
under the first step of Chevron: "Dictionaries can be useful aids in statutory
interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words
272
mean as used in a particular statutory context.
Thus, the opinions of the late 1980s and 1990s show a court divided and
confused by Chevron. At times the Justices describe and apply Chevron
textually, at other times, intentionally. There is no consistency, just a
muddy battlefield.

264. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 223.
266. Id. at 225-26 (contending that the Court should give deference to the agency's
choice among dictionary definitions, as it did in Boston & Me. Corp.).
267. Id. at 227-28 (arguing that the word "modify" cannot mean both small changes and
fundamental changes, and announcing that the "modify" means "moderate change").
268. Id. at 234.
269. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 245 (finding that the FCC considered competing interests and policies
consistently with the goals set forth by Congress in the Communications Act).
272. Id. at 240.
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D. Chevron's Senescence: Textualism Reigns
While Justice Stevens clung tenaciously to Chevron's intentionalist
heritage, few of the other Justices clung with him, and those who did left
the Court. In just ten short years, the war ended. Today, Chevron's first
step is routinely described and applied as a search for mere textual
clarity.273 The battle appears to be over, at least until the composition of
the Court changes again.
The cases during the late 1990s and into the early 2000s show Justices
who are almost impatient with Chevron's first step as they play lip service
to it, and then examine more fully whether the agency's interpretation was
reasonable under the second step.274 Essentially, the Court conflates the
two steps: ambiguity is implied while reasonableness is examined more
closely and thoroughly. Indeed, the Court appears to have moved its more
searching inquiry from step one to step two. In other words, the Justices
will review the purpose of the statute, the enactment history, and the
legislative history in determining whether an agency's interpretation of a
statute is reasonable. For example, in 1995, Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court in NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A.
v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.275 The issue before the Court was
whether the Comptroller of Currency's determination that national banks
could serve as agents in the sale of annuities was a reasonable construction
of the National Bank Act.276 The Comptroller had determined that such
sales were "incidental" to "the business of banking. 277 In reviewing the
Comptroller's determination under Chevron's first step, Justice Ginsberg
simply repeated Chevron's equivocal direction.2 78 Implying, but never
saying directly, that the text was ambiguous, she moved directly to step
two, reviewed the text of the statute and the enactment history, and

273.

See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) ("Accordingly,

the question before us is whether the text of the statute resolves the issue, or, if not, whether
the [agency's] interpretation is permissible in light of the deference to be accorded the

agency under the statutory scheme.").

274. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) (stating simply that "Congress

has not 'directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"' before moving to step two
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984))).
275. 513 U.S. 251, 253 (1995).
276. Id. at 254.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 257 (stating that when faced with an administrator's statutory exposition, the
inquiry should begin with whether Congress's intent is clear regarding "the precise question
at issue" (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842)).
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concluded that the agency's interpretation was reasonable and "in accord
with the legislature's intent., 279 Justice Ginsberg spoke of looking for
intent, but she looked at step two, rather than step one.
Similarly, in 1997, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court in Auer v. Robbins.280 One of the issues 28 1 in that case was whether
the Secretary of Labor's "salary-basis" test, which was used to determine
an employee's exempt status, was a permissible reading of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 282 Quoting Chevron, Justice Scalia wrote that "[b]ecause
Congress ha[d] not 'directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' [the
Court] must sustain the Secretary's approach so long as it is 'based on a
permissible construction of the statute.' ' 283 Like Justice Ginsburg in
NationsBank, Justice Scalia never analyzed whether the Congress had
directly spoken to the precise question, but rather moved almost
immediately to the second step of Chevron to find that the agency's
interpretation was reasonable.284 Unlike Justice Ginsburg, Justice Scalia
looked only at the text of the statute in his analysis at the second step.
Again in 1999, Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.285 The issue was whether the BIA's
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act was reasonable. The
Act gave the Attorney General the discretion to withhold an alien's
deportation when the Attorney General determined that the alien's life or
freedom would be threatened "on account of ... political opinion. 286
Under the statute, the Attorney General must withhold deportation if an
alien establishes that he is likely to be subject to persecution for political
reasons, but the Attorney General cannot withhold deportation if the alien
committed a "serious nonpolitical crime" before arriving in the United
States. 87 Relying on its prior precedent, the BIA interpreted "serious
nonpolitical crime" to include crimes in which the "political aspect of the
offense outweigh[ed] its common-law character.' 2 88 The Ninth Circuit
reversed without applying Chevron.

279. Id. at 259.
280. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
281. This case is perhaps better known for a second issue: the proper level of deference
an agency receives for an interpretation of its own regulation. Id. at 461.
282. Id. at 454.
283. Id. at 457 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)).
284. Compareid. at 458, with NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 259.
285. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
286. Id. at 419 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (2000)).
287. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C)).
288. Id. at 422 (quoting Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec., 90, 97-98 (B.I.A. 1984)).
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In reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy chastised it for not
appropriately applying Chevron, arguing "that the BIA should be accorded
Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms 'concrete meaning
through a process of case-by-case adjudication.' ' 289 After implying that the
statute was ambiguous but never actually completing the analysis, Justice
Kennedy immediately moved to review the reasonableness of the agency's
290
decision under Chevron's second step and then deferred to the agency.
In reviewing the reasonableness of the BIA's interpretation under step two,
Justice Kennedy did look beyond the text to the purpose of the Act.29 '
Three years later in Yellow Transportation,Inc. v. Michigan,292 Justice

O'Connor-writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer 293-described Chevron's
first step as "whether the text of the statute resolves the issue ....

If the

statute speaks clearly 'to the precise question at issue,' we 'must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' 294 The issue in
Yellow Transportation was whether a state that waived a registration fee
actually "collected or charged" the fee that it waived.295 Through its
regulations, the agency interpreted the statute to require that the fee
actually be collected, not waived.296 While Justice O'Connor did articulate
a two-step process, she similarly conflated these two steps. She quoted
Chevron, implied ambiguity, and reviewed only the text of the Act to find
the agency's interpretation reasonable.29 7 Justice Stevens wrote separately
to concur because he believed that the statute gave the ICC the authority to
regulate as it did.298 Because the delegation was explicit, he did not view
the interpretation as one requiring Chevron deference. 299
Similarly, in Barnhart v. Thomas,3 °° the Court moved quickly to the
second step. There, the Court was asked to decide whether the Social
Security Administration's interpretation of Title VII was entitled to
deference. The agency, by regulation, had determined that the clause
289.

Id. at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,448-49 (1987)).

290. Id.
291. Id. at 427 (explaining that, pursuant to INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,one of the primary
purposes of the Act "was to implement the principles agreed to in the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees").
292. 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
293. Id. at 38.
294. Id. at 45 (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
295. Id. at 46.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that because it was a "permissible
exercise of the board authority vested in the ICC to 'establish a fee system,"' he concurred
with the judgment (internal quotation and citations omitted)).
299. See id. at 50.
300. 540 U.S. 20 (2003).
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"which exists in the national economy" in the statute did not apply to
"previous work." 0'0 Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion for a unanimous
Court,3 °2 described Chevron as follows: "[W]hen a statute speaks clearly to
the issue at hand we 'must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress,' but when the statute 'is silent or ambiguous' we must
defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its
implementation., 30 3 Referring to the rule of last antecedent, in which a
limiting clause refers only to the noun directly preceding it, Justice Scalia
concluded that the agency's interpretation was consistent with the plain
language of the statute and, thus, was reasonable under step two. 30 4 No
justice disagreed or dissented.
And again in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X
Internet Services,30 5 the majority conflated the two steps. Justice Thomas,
speaking for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer,30 6 wrote:
At the first step, we ask whether the statute's plain terms "directly
addres[s] the precise question at issue." If the statute is ambiguous on
the point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpretation so long as
is "a reasonable policy choice for the agency to
the construction
,30 7
make."
True to his directive, Justice Thomas did not review sources beyond the
text.30 8 Justice Scalia dissented, not because he disagreed with Justice
Thomas's Chevron approach, but because he found the statute clear and
309
contrary to the agency's interpretation.
Despite the dominance of the textualist approach at step one, some of the
Justices have added an intentionalist element to step two. For example, in
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,310 workers whose benefits
were cut brought a reverse age discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 311 While Justice Souter-writing for
the majority of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Stevens,
Breyer, and Ginsberg-was uncertain whether Skidmore or Chevron should
apply, he concluded that which test applied did not matter.31 2 Rather, even
301.

Id. at 25.

302. /d.at21.
303. Id. at 26 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)).
304. Id. at 29-30.

305.

545 U.S. 967 (2005).

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 987-89.

306. Id. at 972.
307. Id. at 986 (alteration in original)
Id. at

(quoting Chevron, 467

1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
540 U.S. 581 (2004).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
Cline, 540 U.S. at 600.

U.S. at

843, 845).
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if Chevron applied, "deference to [an agency's] statutory interpretation is
called for only when the devices of judicial construction have been tried
and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent."313 Then Justice
Souter reviewed "the text, structure, purpose, and [legislative and social]
314
history of the [Act], along with its relationship to other federal statutes
to find that the statute did not mean what the agency said it meant. 3 15 In
other words, the agency's interpretation was unreasonable under step two
because it conflicted with the purpose and history of the Act.
Justice Scalia dissented. He chided Justice Souter's approach, calling it
"anything but 'regular.' ' 316 In an extremely short dissent, Justice Scalia
merely said, "Because [the Act] 'does not unambiguously require a
different interpretation, and... the [agency's] regulation is an entirely
reasonable interpretation 317of the text,' I would defer to the agency's
authoritative conclusion."
Justice Thomas also dissented. He agreed that the plain language of the
statute mandated the agency's interpretation. 31 8 Criticizing the majority's
opinion, Justice Thomas focused on the majority's reliance on the social
history that led to the Act's passage: "[T]he Court, of necessity, creates a
new tool of statutory interpretation, and then proceeds to give this newly
created 'social history' analysis dispositive weight. 3 19 But unlike Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas appeared willing to consider legislative history in
some Chevron analyses: "the statute is clear, and hence there is no need to
delve into the legislative history ....
In 2005, two more Justices left the Court-Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor-to be replaced with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel
Alito. While it is too early to determine what effect these changes will
have on the Court's Chevron analysis, Justices Roberts and Alito seem to
have accepted Justice Scalia's approach as seen recently in Rapanos
v. United States.321 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality-Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Alito 322-rejected the Army Corps of

313.
314.

315.
316.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

317. Id. at 602 (quoting Bamhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 29-30 (2003) and United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001)).
318. Cline, 540 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the younger workers
should be able to sue for discrimination).
319. Id.

320. Id. at 606.
321. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
322. Id. at 2214. Justice Kennedy concurred, arguing that an earlier opinion of the Court
had added the "significant nexus" requirement. Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Because that requirement was not addressed in this case, Justice Kennedy would have
remanded. Id. at 2252.
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Engineers's interpretation of "the waters of the United States" in the Clean
Water Act.323 The Corps had interpreted "waters" to include "virtually any
land feature over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible
mark---even if only 'the presence of litter and debris.' ' 324 Citing Chevron,
Justice Scalia analyzed the text of the statute and held that the agency's
"expansive interpretation ...[was not] 'based on a permissible
construction of the statute.' 32 5 The term "waters" contemplates "relatively
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water, 3 26 not tributaries where
"water occasionally or intermittently flows": 327 "The plain language of the
statute simply does not authorize this 'Land Is Waters' approach to federal
jurisdiction., 328 Moreover, Justice Scalia continued, even if the language
were ambiguous, the EPA's interpretation would be unreasonable.329
Justice Stevens, in dissent-joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer 33 0 -disagreed with the plurality's textual focus. To Justice Stevens,
"the proper analysis [was] straightforward ....The Corps' . . . decision to
treat these wetlands as encompassed within the term 'waters of the United
States' [was] a quintessential example of the Executive's reasonable
interpretation of a statutory provision." 331 The language of the statute was
at least ambiguous, and the agency's interpretation reasonable. In applying
332
Chevron, Justice Stevens did not limit himself to an analysis of the text,
but looked also at the purpose of the statute.3 33 In response to Justice
Stevens's argument that the agency's interpretation would better further the
purposes of the Act, Justice Scalia wrote that "no law pursues its purpose at
scope are no less a
all costs, and that the textual limitations upon a law's ' 334
part of its 'purpose' than its substantive authorizations."
Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence scolded the agency for failing to
limit its boundless interpretation despite the Court's earlier rejection of a
similar interpretation.335 The Chief Justice noted that the agency had
323. Id. at 2225 (majority opinion) (rejecting the Corps' argument that the "waters of the
United States" includes "channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally,
or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall").
324. Id. at 2217 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e) (2006)).
325. Id. at 2225 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
326. Id. at 2221.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2222.
329. Id. at 2224.
330. Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)).
332. Id. at 2262-63 (disagreeing that the word "waters" required continually flowing
water).
333. Id. at 2265 (discussing the law's purpose to prevent the pollution from spreading).
334. Id. at 2232 (majority opinion).
335. Id. at 2235 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Co.
v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
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unsuccessfully tried to amend its interpretation using notice-and-comment
rulemaking.336 Had the agency been successful, the Chief Justice suggested
he may have been more willing to join the dissent's opinion:
Agencies delegated rulemaking authority... are afforded generous
leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to
administer. Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless
clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water Act, the
Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their
authority.

Chief Justice Roberts thus implied that if the EPA had issued the
interpretation via a new informal rulemaking, then deference would be due.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Roberts' rationale makes little sense. The
plurality opinion, which he joined, found the language of the statute to be
unambiguous. 338 Because the language was unambiguous, Congress's
words controlled; no deference to the agency's regulation was due at all.
But Justice Roberts's opinion suggested that if the EPA had simply issued a
new regulatton saying essentially the same thing, the new regulation would
be entitled to deference. Why? Is a statute unambiguous when the
agency's interpretation is too broad, but ambiguous when the agency's
opinion is a little more reasonable? Or-and more likely-did the Chief
Justice simply skip straight to Chevron's second step to find that the
agency's first interpretation was unreasonable, while another interpretation
might not be? Whichever is accurate, the opinion offers little insight into
his position in the textualist-intentionalist debate.
Most recently, the Court decided Zuni Public School District No. 89
v. Department of Education.339 The issue in Zuni was whether the
Department of Education's interpretation of the Federal Impact Aid
Program was reasonable.
That statute identified the method the
Department was to use to determine "whether a State's public school
funding program 'equalize[d] expenditures' throughout the State., 340 In
doing so, the statute required the Department "to 'disregard' school
districts 'with per-pupil expenditures.., above the 95th percentile or
below the 5th percentile of such expenditures.., in the State."' 34 1 The
Department interpreted the emphasized language as allowing it to consider

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 2236 ("The proposed rulemaking went nowhere.").
Id. at 2235-36 (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 2220-24 (majority opinion).
127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
Id. at 1538.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).
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the size of the district's expenditures per pupil, as well as the population of
a school district.342 It was the latter consideration that was not readily
apparent from the statute's text.
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, upheld the agency's
interpretation of this clause.343 In so doing, Justice Breyer first identified
Chevron's first step as textualist: "if the language of the statute is open or
ambiguous-that is, if Congress left a 'gap' for the agency to fill-then we
must uphold the Secretary's interpretation as long as it is reasonable. 344
But, rather than determine whether the language was open or ambiguous,
Justice Breyer instead turned to the second step of Chevron's test: whether
the interpretation was reasonable.34 5 In determining the reasonableness of
the agency's interpretation, he reviewed the statute's history and purpose to
conclude that the Department's interpretation was reasonable despite the
language of the statute's text.346
In the opinion, Justice Breyer admitted that under Chevron today, text is
controlling:
[N]ormally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the
Secretary's method would be determinative if the plain language of the
statute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the
Secretary's interpretation ....Under this Court's precedents, if the
intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed347by the statutory
language at issue, that would be the end of our analysis.
Despite the clarity of the text in Zuni, Justice Breyer reasoned that
because the language was technical, it was capable of multiple meanings.348
Exactly how he reached this conclusion is not easy to understand. In any
event, Justice Breyer, in backwards fashion, analyzed the Department's
interpretation using a textualist approach, found the statute to be
ambiguous, and concluded that the Department's interpretation was
reasonable because it furthered the statute's purpose.

342. Id. at 1538 (setting out the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of Education).
343. Id. at 1538-39.
344. Id. at 1540 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984)).

345. Id. at 1541 (examining legislative history and stating that "[flor purposes of
exposition, we depart from a normal order of discussion, namely an order that first considers
Zuni's statutory language argument").
346. Id. at 1543 ("Thus, the history and purpose of the disregard instruction indicate that
the Secretary's calculation formula is a reasonable method that carries out Congress'[s]
likely intent in enacting the statutory provision before us.").
347. Id. (internal citations omitted).
348. Id. at 1546.
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Justice Breyer's analysis is convoluted and difficult to follow. First, he
applies Chevron backwards. Second, he does not clearly explain why the
text is ambiguous simply because it is technical. 349 Had Justice Breyer not
adopted the textualist view of Chevron, his opinion would have been easier
to write, to understand, and to accept. Instead, in straining to reject clear
text and reach a result he believed matched Congress's intent, Justice
Breyer confuses the reader. What Justice Breyer should have said is that
this case represented one instance in which evidence other than the text
showed either: (1) that the language was ambiguous and the agency's
interpretation was reasonable (Justice Kennedy's point in his concurrence),
or (2) that Congress intended the Department to interpret the statute exactly
as the Department did (Justice Stevens's point in his concurrence). Instead,
Justice Breyer wrote an opinion that adopts a textualist approach to
Chevron, but then immediately misapplies that approach.
Rejecting Justice Breyer's textualist approach, Justice Stevens concurred
but pointed out that "'in rare cases the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,
In contrast, Justice
and those intentions must be controlling.'' 350
Kennedy's concurrence, which Justice Alito joined, agreed that Chevron's
first step is textualist, 35' but disagreed with Justice Breyer's decision to
reverse Chevron's two-step test:
The opinion of the Court, however, inverts Chevron's logical
progression. Were the inversion to become systemic, it would create the
impression that agency policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools
of statutory construction, are shaping the judicial interpretation of
statutes. It is our obligation to set a good example; and so, in my view, it
and more faithful to Chevron, to arrange the
would have been preferable,
352
opinion differently.
Perhaps at this point, no one will be surprised to learn that Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, dissented. Taking aim
at Justice's Breyer's "cart-before-the-horse approach,, 353 Justice Scalia
returned to "Statutory Interpretation 101," 54 by focusing first on the text.

349. Id. at 1543-46 (discussing, but failing to explain, that the ambiguity of technical
language is context-dependent).
350. Id. at 1549 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).

351. Id. at 1550 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When considering an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute, a court first determines 'whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))).
352. Id. at 1551.
353. Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Breyer's analysis of
Chevron's second step first).
354. Id.
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Finding the text unambiguous, Justice Scalia's job was finished and the
Department's interpretation, which was at odds with the clear language,
was also finished.3 55
Today, after more than twenty years and a change in the composition of
the Court, Chevron's first step has narrowed from a search for legislative
intent to a search for statutory clarity. While none of the Justices, including
Justice Scalia, consistently use one approach and only one approach, they
certainly have strong preferences. For Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy,
and most recently and perhaps most surprisingly, Breyer,356 the debate
appears to be over. Chevron's first step has been transformed into a simple
search for textual clarity. Justice Kennedy may moderate as he replaces
Justice O'Connor as the swing vote, but based on357the opinions that he
authored to date, he is a first step Chevron textualist.
It is still too early to tell which approach Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito will take. As of the drafting of this article, both Justices had
signed on to a limited number of cases in which Chevron applied.358 Only
recently did Justice Alito author a Chevron opinion: National Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife.359 In that opinion, Justice Alito
said, "[D]eference is appropriate only where 'Congress has not directly
360
addressed the precise question at issue' through the statutory text."
While it is too early to know for sure which approach they will consistently
adopt, both seem headed towards textualism.
For Justice Stevens, the approach remains intentionalist. For the
remaining Justices-Souter and Ginsburg-Chevron remains more
complex: sometimes they sign onto a textualist opinion, sometimes an
intentionalist361 one. For these Justices, perhaps pragmatism outweighs
dogmatism.

355. Id. at 1555.
356. Because Justice Breyer is a staunch supporter of purposivism, it is surprising to find
him adopting the textualist version of Chevron. Indeed, until recently, I would have linked
Justices Breyer and Stevens together as united against Justice Scalia's textualist Chevron
approach. But Justice Breyer's most recent opinion, Zuni Public School District No. 89
v. Departmentof Education, 127 S.Ct. 1534 (2007), leaves little doubt that he has accepted
this formulation.
357. See infra Part III.E.
358. 1 could find no D.C. District Court of Appeals cases citing Chevron that the Chief
Justice authored.
359. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
360. Id. at 2534 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984)). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined
his opinion. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented.
361. Interestingly, Justice Breyer touts a broader approach to statutory interpretation
more generally. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (advocating an approach that considers a law's purpose
and consequences and does not simply rely on a rigid theory ofjudicial interpretation).
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In part, the Justices' warring approaches to Chevron's first step likely
reflect their individual assessment of the relevance of legislative history
more generally, not just within Chevron's first step.362 Justice Scalia, for
example, refuses to use legislative history in virtually all statutory
interpretation cases,363 not just Chevron cases. Other Justices, such as
Stevens and Breyer, disagree with him and view legislative history as
relevant to meaning.364 Additionally, the Justices' preferred approach may
reflect their view of Chevron; those Justices who believe the Court should
be deferring to the agency more often might prefer textualism, 365 while
those who believe the Court should be "faithful agents '366 to the
Legislature might prefer intentionalism. In any event, the intentionalists
seem to have lost the battle, at least for now.

362. See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS AND CASES 150 (3d ed. 2006) (describing how Justices Scalia and Thomas, in
particular, generally disapprove of the use of legislative history).
363. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 442 n.4 (1990) (quoting JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 174-75 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988)) (quoting Justice Scalia's comments
during a panel discussion: "I play the game like everybody else... I'm in a system which
has accepted rules and legislative history is used. . . You read my opinions, I sin with the
rest of them").
364. See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 15, at 191 (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991)). See generally Michael Sherman, The Use of Legislative
History: A Debate Between Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer, 16 ADMIN. L. NEWS 1, 13
(Summer 1991).
365. Justice Scalia would disagree with this statement:
In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a
person is... a "strict constructionist" . . . and the degree to which that person
favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious. One
who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text
and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron
will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not
personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is
willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the
legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will
discern a much broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may
adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which
Chevron will require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is
infinitely greater.
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511,521 (1989).
366. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
5, 15-22 (2001) (arguing that the textualist approach provides the best means of
implementing the faithful agent model).
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E. Chevron's Demise: Textualism Wins the Battle but Loses the War
As Chevron turns twenty-something, its relevance is waning. Indeed,
today, "Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme Court. 3 67 Although
some argue that Chevron's imprint is widening,368 it is actually narrowing.
The Supreme Court has narrowed Chevron in two ways: (1) it cites the case
less frequently than in the past, and (2) it has limited Chevron's application
by creating another step and by limiting one of Chevron's rationales:
implicit delegation.
First, the Court cites Chevron far less frequently today than in years past.
In 1992, Professor Thomas Merrill examined the opinions of the Supreme
Court and found that on average per year "[t]he Supreme Court decide[d]
somewhere between ten and twenty cases in which it confront[ed] an issue
about whether to defer to an administrative interpretation of a statute. 369
Professor Merrill reviewed all the cases in which at least one Justice cited
Chevron.370 But my own more recent search was significantly less fruitful;
the Court cites Chevron much less frequently than it used to. For example,
during the 2005-2006 Term, the majority referred to Chevron only three
times: Rapanos v. United States,37 1 S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of
Environmental Protection,372 and Gonzales v. Oregon.373 Additionally, the
dissent mentioned Chevron in another case solely to support the notion that
an agency could issue a regulation if it chose.3 74 In the 2004-2005 Term,
the majority
cited
Chevron only once,
in National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,375 while
376
dissenting and concurring Justices cited Chevron two more times.

367. Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 8, at 982; see, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (failing to mention Chevron in the majority
opinion despite Justice Scalia's comment: "This is an absolutely classic case for deference

to agency interpretation").
368. See The Story of Chevron, supra note 1, at 399 & n.2. According to Professor
Merrill, Chevron "has been cited in over 7,000 cases, making it the most frequently cited

case in administrative law." Further, Professor Merrill thinks that Chevron may well soon
surpass Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as the most cited case overall. Id.
369. Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 8, at 980-81 (reviewing the Supreme Court
decisions from the 1984 through 1990 Terms).

370. Id. at 980-81 &n.51.
371.
372.

126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2006) (discussing whether to defer to agency interpretation

of the term "discharge").
373. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
374. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 70 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (supposing the

promulgation of a hypothetical uniform federal procedural standard if the need arose).
375. 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005) (deferring to the Federal Communication Commission's
interpretation of the term "telecommunications service" in the Communications Act).
376. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (citing Chevron in the
concurrence and dissent); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402 (2005) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (citing Chevron only in the dissenting opinion).
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Similarly, Chevron was cited a mere five times in the 2003-2004 Term. A
majority of the Court cited Chevron four times: Household Credit Services,
Inc. v. Pfennig,3 77 General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,378 Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA 379 and Barnhart
v. Thomas.380 In one additional case, Justice Scalia cited Chevron in his
concurrence. 38 And, in one case, the dissent cited Chevron, but the case
did not involve an agency deference question.3 82 Thus, the Court has
reduced
its citations from ten to twenty per year to approximately three to
38 3
five.
To be fair, the Court generally appears to be hearing fewer cas 384.

Moreover, citation numbers do not explain whether this difference reflects:
(1) a decline in cases involving review of agency interpretations of statutes
more generally, (2) a decline in the number of appeals sought by agencies,
or (3) a decline in the Court's use of Chevron in such cases.385 But because
the Court controls its own docket,386 the distinction between these

377. 541 U.S. 232 (2004).
378. 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (refusing to determine whether Chevron or Skidmore
deference applied when the agency was so clearly wrong).
379. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
380. 540 U.S. 20 (2003).
381. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
Chevron and not Skidmore deference applied to an agency interpretation made in the
agency's brief).
382. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 269 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Chevron only for the proposition that "paying special attention to
administrative views is well established in American law").
383. After I wrote this draft, however, the Supreme Court decided three important
Chevron cases: Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Ed., 127 S. Ct. 1354 (2007)
(applying a textualist-based Chevron step one); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007) (applying Chevron deference to an informal agency regulation, even
though the agency had identified the regulations as only interpretative); Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (applying a textualist-based
Chevron step one). Perhaps I chose my title too hastily.
384. Apparently, Supreme Court cases are down overall. "After decades of decline in its
caseload, the court [sic] is once again on track to take its fewest number of cases in modern
history .... In William H. Rehnquist's first term as chief justice in 1986, the court [sic]
disposed of 175 cases. That had dwindled to 82 cases last year after Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr. took over." Robert Barnes, Justices Continue Trend of Hearing Fewer Cases,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2007, at A4.

385. While the sample size is small, I did review the cases from the 2005-2006 term. I
found that the Court had applied Chevron in the few cases in which it was applicable,
suggesting that the decline is less about the Court applying Chevron less often and more
about the Court taking fewer Chevron-related cases. Additionally, the decrease could
represent agencies' decisions not to seek the review from what they view as a less
deferential court. Data on file with the author.
386. "There is one reason for the decline from the heavy workloads of the 1980s that
everyone agrees on: A 1988 congressional decision made at the court's [sic] behest
eliminated a number of mandatory appeals, leaving the [Jiustices to pretty much set their
own agenda." Barnes, supra note 384.
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differences may be academic; whether the Court chooses to hear fewer
agency interpretation cases or simply fails to use Chevron when it does,
Chevron is still less important today than it was fifteen years ago.
In addition to citing Chevron less often, the Court has curtailed Chevron
in another way: by limiting the types of agency interpretations entitled to
Chevron deference-what Professor Cass Sunstein calls Chevron "stepzero." 387 When the Court decided Chevron, it said nothing about the types
of agency interpretations entitled to deference. Prior to Chevron, the
formality of the agency's interpretation process was simply a factor in the
Court's analysis. Interpretations made through a more deliberative process,
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, were more persuasive than those
interpretations made through a less deliberative process, such as policy and
interpretative statements. 388 But Chevron itself did not distinguish between
deliberative agency decisionmaking and non-deliberative agency
decisionmaking. In fact, immediately after Chevron was decided, the Court
applied it to all types of agency interpretations. 389 However, general
applicability is no longer the rule.
In 2000 and 2001, the Court decided two cases, Christensen v. Harris
County390 and United States v. Mead Corp.,39 1 in which the Court
substantially limited Chevron's applicability. In Christensen, the Court
examined the level of deference to be accorded interpretative letters from
the Department of Labor construing the Fair Labor Standards Act.392 That
Act required employers, including states, to pay their employees who work
more than forty hours per week overtime pay or compensation time.
Consequently, "Harris County became concerned that it lacked the
resources to pay monetary compensation to employees who worked
387. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207-11
(2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Step Zero] (discussing the disagreements between Justices
Scalia and Breyer on questions involving Chevron step one). Interestingly, it might be more
appropriate to call this analysis Chevron step one and one-half because courts should only
need to reach the issue before proceeding to Chevron's second step. In other words, if the
statute is clear, there is no need to consider whether a court should defer under Chevron or
Skidmore. Accord Amy J.Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What
Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1908 (2006) (suggesting that the
question of the type of deference should not be placed before Chevron's first step).
388. See Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 387, at 211 (explaining the difference between
the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines).
389. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (suggesting that Chevron should
apply to an agency's internal guideline); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp.,
503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (applying Chevron to an agency's interpretation made
informally); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 439 (1986)
(suggesting that Chevron should apply to an agency's longstanding "practice and belief');
cf Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 483 (1998)
(applying Chevron to an agency's approval of a credit union's charter).
390. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
391. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
392. Christensen,529 U.S. at 586-87.
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overtime after reaching the statutory cap on compensatory time accrual and
time." 393
to employees who left their jobs with sizable reserves of accrued
Concerned, the county wrote the Department of Labor, the agency that
administers the Act, and asked whether the county could require employees
to use compensation time.394 The agency said "no." Harris County did it
anyway, and the employees sued, asserting that the required use of
compensation time violated the Act.395
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for the majority. Reviewing the
statute, he concluded that it said "nothing about restricting an employer's
efforts to require employees to use compensatory time. 396 He then
addressed the level of deference to be afforded to the agency's opinion
letter. Refusing to apply Chevron, he wrote, "[I]nterpretations contained in
formats such as opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' under our decision
in Skidmore, but only to the extent that those interpretations have the
'power to persuade.' '397 Applying Skidmore deference, Justice Thomas
to this interpretation at all, finding it completely
refused to defer
398
"backwards."
Justice Scalia concurred, but wrote separately to criticize the majority's
return to Skidmore.399 In Justice Scalia's view, regardless of the way the
agency arrived at its interpretation, Chevron applied. Applying Chevron to
the agency's opinion letter, Justice Scalia concluded that the agency's
interpretation was unreasonable.4 ° °
Shortly after the Court decided Christensen, it affirmed its divergent
approach to agency interpretations lacking the "force of law",40 1 in United
States v. Mead Corp.4 °2 At issue in that case was the degree of deference
owed to a ruling letter from the United States Customs Service, which
interpreted the Harmonized Tariff Schedule.40 3 The Mead Corporation
imported day planners, which the Customs Service had treated for several
years as exempt from tariff.40 4 But in 1993, the Customs Service abruptly
changed course and identified the day planners as "diaries" subject to a

393. Id. at 580.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 581.
396. Id. at 585 (emphasis omitted).
397. Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
398. Id. at 588.
399. Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do not comprehend Justice Breyer's
contention that Skidmore deference... is not an anachronism.").
400. Id.at 591.
401. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001).
402. Id. at 237-38.
403. Id. at 221 (questioning whether a tariff classification ruling deserved any

deference).

404. Id. at 225 (exempting day planners from 1989 to 1993).
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four percent tariff.40 5 When Mead protested, the agency sent a "carefully
reasoned but never published" 40 6 ruling letter to explain its change of
course. Mead sued.
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion.40 7 The deference issue was
central to the Court's opinion. In part, the majority reasoned that the
formality of the decisionmaking process determined whether Chevron or
Skidmore deference applied.40 8 According to Justice Souter, Chevron
deference is appropriate when an agency is required to engage in, and
undertakes, notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 40 9 But
Justice Souter muddied the waters of Chevron applicability when he wrote,
"[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded., 410 He
suggested that precedental value and binding
character, while important,
411
also do "not add up to Chevron entitlement.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia dissented in a lengthy opinion. 4 , 2 He
was critical of the majority's confusing direction for Chevron's
application,41 3 and he disapproved of the majority's resurrection of
Skidmore's "totality of the circumstances" test: 414 "We will be sorting out
the consequences of the Mead doctrine, which has today replaced the
Chevron doctrine, for years to come., 41 5 According to Justice Scalia,
deference to agency opinions is all or nothing: either Chevron deference or
no deference.4 16 And Chevron applies when the agency interpretation is
"authoritative," meaning that it represents the agency's final opinion on the
issue.4t 7
The majority was skeptical of Justice Scalia's approach,
countering that "Justice Scalia's first priority over the years has been to
limit and simplify [the Chevron doctrine]. The Court's choice has been to
tailor deference to variety. 41 8
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 220.
408. Id. at 229 (suggesting that formality would be a "good indicator of delegation").
409. Id. at 230 (assuming that under those circumstances, Congress anticipated
administrative action).
410. Id. at 230-31 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 256-57, 263 (1995)).
411. Id. at 232.
412. Id. at 239-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 241 (chiding that "[t]he Court's new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor
sustainable in practice").
414. Id. at 250 (arguing that Skidmore creates excess litigation).
415. Id. at 239 (internal quotations omitted).
416. Id. at 237 (majority opinion) (characterizing Justice Scalia's dissent).
417. Id.
418. Id. at 236.
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The next term, in Barnhart v. Walton,419 the Court again addressed the

level of deference to be afforded an agency regulation. Rather than resolve
the confusion, however, the Court added a new level of complexity to
Chevron's step zero. In Barnhart, the Court was faced with how much
deference to give a Social Security Administration's regulation,
interpreting the Social Security Act. 420 Because the regulation was the
product of notice-and-comment rulemaking, Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, applied Chevron deference. So far, no surprises. But Justice
Breyer did not stop there. Before issuing the regulation, the agency had
originally articulated the same interpretation in less formal ways, including
by letter, by manual, and by adjudication. Justice Breyer observed that the
agency's interpretation was "longstanding" and that the Court normally
"accord[s] particular deference to an agency interpretation of 'longstanding'
duration. ,421 Justice Breyer, in dicta, was quick to point out that even though
the original interpretation was arrived at by less formal procedures, such
informality "does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial
deference otherwise its due., ' 422 Rather, a number of factors help determine
whether Chevron analysis is appropriate: "[T]he interstitial nature of the
legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time ....
The factors that Justice Breyer suggested are appropriate to determine
whether Congress intended courts to defer are eerily reminiscent of
pre-Chevron days: the more reasoned and considered the agency opinion,
the more deference due.424 Chevron step zero would have been much
easier had the Court simply applied Chevron when the agency used more
formal procedures and Skidmore when the agency used less formal
procedures. But the majority was unwilling to conclude that such a
simplistic approach was warranted given the variety of procedural choices
425
available to agencies.
Once again, Justice Scalia concurred separately. For him, the issue of
whether Chevron applied was simple: the agency decision was reached as a
result of notice-and-comment rulemaking.4 2 6 End of debate.

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 219-20.
Id.at 221.
Id. at 222.

424.

See supra Part II.

425. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 387, at 216.
426. Barnhart,535 U.S. at 226-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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While Mead and Christensen had seemed to suggest that when Congress
directs an agency to use more formal procedures and the agency does so,
Chevron applies, Barnhart suggested that even when the agency uses less
formal procedures, Chevron may apply. 427 If the dicta in Barnhartholds,
then Chevron deference applies both when Congress delegates relatively
formal procedures and the agency uses them, and when Congress provides
other evidence that it intended courts to defer to the agency interpretation.
But just when Chevron applies remains unclear. Barnharthas not aided
certainty in the lower courts 428 or in the classroom. According to Cass
Sunstein:
[U]nder Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart, the real question is
Congress's (implied) instructions in the particular statutory scheme.

The grant of authority to act with the force of law is a sufficient but not
has granted an
necessary condition for a court to find that Congress 429
agency the power to interpret ambiguous statutory terms.
In some ways, Christensen, Mead, and Barnhartthus show the majority

beginning to reject Scalia's simplistic reformulation of Chevron to return
the case to its intentionalist underpinnings. With step zero, the Justices
returned the Court's focus to congressional intent, but the locus of the
inquiry changed. Whereas the Court's focus in Chevron had been on
Congress's intent regarding the meaning of the specific statutory language
at issue, Mead changed the focus to Congressional intent regarding
delegation to the agency: when Congress intends courts to defer, courts
should defer.
Despite Justice Scalia's heartfelt adherence to a world without Skidmore,
he has lost this battle. Today, the first step in Chevron analysis is whether
Chevron applies at all. While at this point the cases fail to offer a simple
test to the lower courts on this issue, we do know that Chevron applies only
to some agency interpretations. All other interpretations receive Skidmore
With fewer agency interpretations entitled to deference,
deference.
Chevron applies less often today than it might have. Indeed, the argument
over Chevron is now more likely.to be whether to apply it at all, rather than
how to apply it. When courts apply Skidmore rather than Chevron, judicial

427. But see the Court's most recent decision in this area: Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007), in which the Court applied Chevron deference to
informal agency regulations (which went through notice and comment procedures), even
though the agency identified the regulations as interpretative.
428. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 387, at 219-21.
429. Id. at 218.
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deference to agencies decreases. 430 "While Chevron deference means that
an agency, not a court, exercises interpretive control, Skidmore deference
means just the opposite. 4 3'
In addition to creating step zero, the Court has limited Chevron's
application in another way: it has limited Chevron's implicit delegation
rationale. In Chevron, one of the Court's rationales for deferring to the
agency's interpretation was that by enacting gaps and creating ambiguities,
Congress intended to delegate implicitly to the agency.4 32 But in a series of
cases, starting with FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,433 the
Court rejected, or at least limited, this rationale.
Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in
the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress
intended such an implicit
.. has 434
delegation .... This is hardly an ordinary case.
In Brown & Williamson, Justice O'Connor-writing for Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-rejected the Food
and Drug Administration's (FDA) attempt to regulate tobacco. The FDA
was authorized to regulate "drugs," "devices," and "combination
products. 43 5 The statute defined these terms as "articles... intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body., 436 The FDA interpreted
this language as allowing it to regulate tobacco and cigarettes.4 37 Despite
the fact that the language of the statute alone was broad enough to support
the agency's interpretation, Justice O'Connor concluded "that Congress
ha[d] directly spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA's jurisdiction
to regulate tobacco products. '' 3S Justice O'Connor supported her holding
by noting that Congress had: (1) created a distinct regulatory scheme for
tobacco products, (2) squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco, and (3) acted repeatedly to preclude other
agencies from exercising authority in this area.439 In this case then, the
majority held that while Congress may not have spoken on the precise
430. Wildermuth, supra note 387, at 1898-99 (citing Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era
of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron
Principlesin United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 327-28 (2002)).
431. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2005).
432. See supra Part 1I.
433. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
434. Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted).
435. Id. at 126 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h) (1994 & Supp. Ii 1997)).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 125 (explaining that the FDA considered nicotine to be a "drug").
438. Id. at 133.
439. Id. at 154-56.
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issue, it had spoken broadly enough on related questions to prevent the
agency from acting at all. Disagreeing, Justice Breyer-writing on behalf
of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg--dissented on the ground that the
statute's language and general purpose both supported the FDA's finding
that cigarettes were within its statutory authority.44 °

Six years later, in another highly political case, Gonzales v. Oregon,44 '
the Court again refused to defer under Chevron. There, the issue before the
Court was "whether the Controlled Substances Act allow[ed] the United
States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law
permitting the procedure.' 4 42 The Justices disagreed over whether the
Attorney General's interpretive rule was entitled to Chevron deference.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.4 43 Justice
Kennedy reasoned that because Congress had not intended the Attorney
General to have such broad interpretative power, Congress had not
delegated interpretative power to the agency: "The idea that Congress gave
the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit
' 444
delegation in the CSA's registration provision is not sustainable.
Accordingly, because implicit delegation was unsustainable, the
interpretation was entitled to Skidmore deference.445 And, given the
importance of the issue to the nation, the majority was particularly
Attorney General's attempt to backdoor its overly broad
skeptical of the
446
interpretation.

A particularly scathing Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that the interpretation
was entitled to Chevron deference and that even if the interpretation was
not entitled to deference, "the most reasonable interpretation of the
Regulation and of the statute would produce the same result.

'447

Thus, the

Court limited one of Chevron's rationales: that when Congress leaves a gap
or writes ambiguously, Congress intended, albeit implicitly, to delegate the
power to interpret the statute to the agency. Now, at least when the issue is
of critical importance, such gaps and ambiguities mean no such thing.

440. Id. at 161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
441. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
442. Id. at 248-49.
443. Id. at 247.
444. Id. at 267.
445. Id. at 268.
446. See id. at 272 (expressing a skeptical view of the Attorney General's position given
the CSA's "silence on the practice of medicine generally and its recognition of state
regulation of the medical profession").
447. Id. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Today, Chevron's stronghold appears to be weakening. As the Court
embraced a textualist Chevron, it simultaneously adopted a more
intentional pre-step (step zero) and limited Chevron's application. Thus,
the Court cites Chevron far less often today than in the past; it applies
Chevron less frequently due to step zero, which limits the doctrine's
applicability; and the Court has limited Chevron's implicit delegation
rationale.
CONCLUSION

Chevron delineated a two-step framework for determining whether an
agency's interpretation of a statute should receive judicial deference. But
the opinion has proved to be less accurate, predictable, and simple than
originally envisioned as is readily apparent from this paper's analysis.
Moreover, the Court's guidance about how to apply Chevron was, at best,
equivocal-hence, the illustrative debate by the majority and minority in
Mississippi Poultry.448 And with the addition of step zero, the Court
created even less certainty for the lower courts. Far from the simple, twostep test many originally envisioned, Chevron has been transformed into a
three-step test that no one, not even the Justices of the Supreme Court,
completely understands.
Chevron's legacy is unclear. Those judges and scholars who viewed
Chevron as an agency-friendly decision have been proved wrong:
"Interestingly, because of the strictures of its first step, Chevron is not quite
the 'agency deference' case that it [was] commonly thought to be by many
of its supporters (and detractors). 4 49 Those judges and scholars who
viewed it as the ultimate structure for determining the appropriate level of
deference to be awarded to agency interpretations have also been proved
wrong; the exceptions have begun to swallow the rule. Chevron is making
a hasty retreat.45 °
If Chevron's demise is imminent, then perhaps it is irrelevant whether
Chevron's first step is a search for Congressional intent or textual clarity.
But, perhaps, the Court's retreat from Chevron would have been less hasty
had the Court remained truer to its original directive. By changing the
nature of the inquiry from "what did Congress intend" to "are the words
clear," the Court affected the power distribution among the various
branches. With an intentionalist approach, law making power would

448.

See supra Part 1.

449. Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 n.34 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 8, at 980-85, to emphasize that Chevron, as applied
by the Supreme Court, has led to less deference to agency interpretations).
450.

See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 21, at 361-62 (asserting that the Court has

substantially reduced its use of Chevron).
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theoretically remain with the Legislature while interpretative power would
vest in the Executive. This power distribution is consistent with Chevron's
implicit delegation doctrine: if Congress was silent
or unclear, it implicitly
451
delegated its law making authority to the agency.
By turning Chevron's first step textualist and limiting its application, the
Court appears to have reclaimed the interpretative power it ceded when
Chevron was decided. Under a textualist approach, what Congress
intended is no longer relevant unless Congress clearly expresses that
intention in the text itself: Congress's law making power is curtailed.
Intuitively, under this approach, agency interpretative power should
increase. Language is inherently ambiguous. It is impossible for Congress
to draft perfectly. If the Justices dogmatically defer to the agency
whenever a statute is ambiguous, agency deference should be the rule
rather than the exception. Sure enough, "the Court's transition from
intentionalism to textualism initially increased Chevron deference.
However, as that transition has moved into subsequent phases, it is now
having the opposite effect., 45 2 As Chevron's first step has become more
text based, the Court has begun to limit Chevron's application. Today,
Chevron applies in fewer cases than in the past because the Court cites it
less frequently, because the Court created step zero, and because the Court
rejected, in some cases, the implicit delegation doctrine. In the end, the
Court's reformulation of Chevron's first step has likely hastened Chevron's
demise.

451. See supra Part II.
452. Pierce, supra note 25, at 751.

